Plato Plato - THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PLATO

Hippias: Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.

Socrates: “Why, then,” he will say, “if they are pleasures no less than the others, [299a] do you take from them this designation and deprive them of being beautiful?” “Because,” we shall say, “everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odor is not pleasant but is beautiful; and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend that it is most pleasant, but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see.” If we say this, Hippias, “I too understand,” he will perhaps say, “that you have all along been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, [299b] because they do not seem so to people; but that is not what I asked, what seems to most people to be beautiful, but what is so.” We shall, then, I fancy, say, as we suggested, “We say that that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful.” Do you think the statement is of any use, Hippias, or shall we say something else?

Hippias: Inevitably, in view of what has been said, Socrates, we must say just that.

Socrates: “Excellent!” he will say. [299c] “Then if that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, that among pleasant things which does not happen to be of that sort would evidently not be beautiful?” Shall we agree?

Hippias: Yes.

Socrates: “Is, then, that which is pleasant through sight,” he will say, “pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and sight?” “No,” we shall say, “that which is pleasant through each of these would not in the least be pleasant through both—for that is what you appear to us to mean—but we said [299d] that either of these pleasant things would be beautiful alone by itself, and both together.” Is not that the reply we shall make?

Hippias: Certainly.

Socrates: “Does, then,” he will say, “any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any pleasant thing whatsoever by this, by being pleasant? I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or smaller or more or less, but whether it differs by just this very thing, by the fact that one of the pleasures is a pleasure and the other is not a pleasure.” “We do not think so.” Do we?

Hippias: No, we do not.

Socrates: “Is it not,” then, he will say, “for some other reason than because they are pleasures that you chose these pleasures out from the other pleasures [299e]—it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight.” Shall we say “What you say is true”?

Hippias: Yes, we shall.

[300a] Socrates: “Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing.” Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?

Hippias: Yes, he speaks the truth.

Socrates: “But yet both are beautiful, as you say.” We do say that, do we not?

Hippias: We do.

Socrates: “They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to each individually; [300b] for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful.” Answer me, as if you were answering him.

Hippias: I answer, and I think it is as you say.

Socrates: If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.

Hippias: And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected?

[300c] Socrates: You think it cannot be?

Hippias: I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.

Socrates: Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.

Hippias: There’s no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.

Socrates: And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you, [300d] a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all; and the thought disturbs me that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.

Hippias: Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.

[300e] Socrates: What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.

Hippias: Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just, [301a] would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also? Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honored or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?

[301b] Socrates: Absolutely.

Hippias: But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality which pertains to both of these together, [301c] but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.

Socrates: Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?

[301d] Hippias: You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.

Socrates: Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two [301e]—so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?