Thomas Jefferson (Declaration) - The Declaration of Independence (Annotated)

FEDERALIST VII – The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

FEDERALIST IX – The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

FEDERALIST X – The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

FEDERALIST XI – The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

FEDERALIST XII – The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue

FEDERALIST XIII – Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

FEDERALIST XIV – Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered

FEDERALIST XV – The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVI – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVII – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XIX – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XX – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XXI – Other Defects of the Present Confederation

FEDERALIST XXII – The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation

FEDERALIST XXIII – The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union

FEDERALIST XXIV – The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

FEDERALIST XXV – The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

FEDERALIST XXVI – The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXVII – The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXVIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXIX – Concerning the Militia

FEDERALIST XXX – Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXII – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXIII – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXIV – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXV – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXVI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXVII – Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government

FEDERALIST XXXVIII – The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed

FEDERALIST XXXIX – The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

FEDERALIST XL – The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained

FEDERALIST XLI – General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution

FEDERALIST XLII – The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

FEDERALIST XLIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

FEDERALIST XLIV – Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

FEDERALIST XLV – The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered

FEDERALIST XLVI – The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

FEDERALIST XLVII – The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts

FEDERALIST XLVIII – These Departments Should Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other

FEDERALIST XLIX – Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government

FEDERALIST L – Periodic Appeals to the People Considered

FEDERALIST LI – The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

FEDERALIST LII – The House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LIII – The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LIV – The Apportionment of Members Among the States

FEDERALIST LV – The Total Number of the House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LVI – The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LVII – The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many

FEDERALIST LVIII – Objection That the Number of Members Will Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered

FEDERALIST LIX – Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LX – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LXI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LXII – The Senate

FEDERALIST LXIII – The Senate Continued

FEDERALIST LXIV – The Powers of the Senate

FEDERALIST LXV – The Powers of the Senate Continued

FEDERALIST LXVI – Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered

FEDERALIST LXVII – The Executive Department

FEDERALIST LXVIII – The Mode of Electing the President

FEDERALIST LXIX – The Real Character of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXX – The Executive Department Further Considered

FEDERALIST LXXI – The Duration in Office of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXII – The Same Subject Continued, and Re–Eligibility of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST LXXIII – The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

FEDERALIST LXXIV – The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXV – The Treaty Making Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXVI – The Appointing Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXVII – The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST LXXVIII – The Judiciary Department

FEDERALIST LXXIX – The Judiciary Continued

FEDERALIST LXXX – The Powers of the Judiciary

FEDERALIST LXXXI – The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority

FEDERALIST LXXXII – The Judiciary Continued

FEDERALIST LXXXIII – The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

FEDERALIST LXXXIV – Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered

FEDERALIST LXXXV – Concluding Remarks

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To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fœderal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the æra in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.