John Calvin - Institutes of the Christian Religion

XV. Hence it appears that the grace of God, in the sense in which this word is used when we treat of regeneration, is the rule of the Spirit for directing and governing the human will. He cannot govern it unless he correct, reform, and renovate it; whence we say that the commencement of regeneration is an abolition of what is from ourselves; nor unless he also excite, actuate, impel, support, and restrain it; whence we truly assert, that all the actions which proceed from this are entirely of the Spirit. At the same time, we fully admit the truth of what Augustine teaches, that the will is not destroyed by grace, but rather repaired; for these two things are perfectly consistent—that the human will may be said to be repaired, when, by the correction of its depravity and perverseness, it is directed according to the true standard of righteousness; and also that a new will may be said to be created in man, because the natural will is so vitiated and corrupted, that it needs to be formed entirely anew. Now, there is no reason why we may not justly be said to perform that which the Spirit of God performs in us, although our own will contributes nothing of itself, independently of his grace. And, therefore, we should remember what we have before cited from Augustine, that many persons labour in vain to find in the human will some good, properly its own. For whatever mixture men study to add from the power of free will to the grace of God, is only a corruption of it; just as if any one should dilute good wine with dirty or bitter water. But although whatever good there is in the human will, proceeds wholly from the internal influence of the Spirit, yet because we have a natural faculty of willing, we are, not without reason, said to do those things, the praise of which God justly claims to himself; first, because whatever God does in us, becomes ours by his benignity, provided we do not apprehend it to originate from ourselves; secondly, because the understanding is ours, the will is ours, and the effort is ours, which are all directed by him to that which is good.

XVI. The other testimonies, which they rake together from every quarter, will not much embarrass even persons of moderate capacities, who have well digested the answers already given. They quote this passage from Genesis: “Unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him;”727 or, as they would translate the words, “Subject to thee shall be its appetite, and thou shalt rule over it;” which they explain to relate to sin, as though the Lord promised Cain, that the power of sin should not obtain dominion over his mind, if he would labour to overcome it. But we say that it is more agreeable to the tenor of the context, to understand it to be spoken concerning Abel. For the design of God in it is to prove the iniquity of that envy, which Cain had conceived against his brother. This he does by two reasons: first, that it was in vain for him to meditate crimes in order to excel his brother in the sight of God, with whom no honour is given but to righteousness; secondly, that he was extremely ungrateful for the favours God had already conferred on him, since he could not bear his brother, even though subject to his authority. But that we may not appear to adopt this explanation, merely because the other is unfavourable to our tenets, let us admit that God spake concerning sin. If it be so, then what the Lord there declares, is either promised or commanded by him. If it be a command, we have already demonstrated that it affords no proof of the power of men: if it be a promise, where is the completion of the promise, seeing that Cain fell under the dominion of sin, over which he ought to have prevailed? They will say, that the promise includes a tacit condition, as though it had been declared to him that he should obtain the victory if he would contend for it; but who can admit these subterfuges? For if this dominion be referred to sin, the speech is doubtless a command, expressive, not of our ability, but of our duty, which remains our duty even though it exceed our ability. But the subject itself, and grammatical propriety, require a comparison to be made between Cain and Abel; in which the elder brother would not have been placed below the younger, if he had not degraded himself by his own wickedness.

XVII. They adduce also the testimony of the Apostle, who says, that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy;”728 whence they conclude, that there is something in the will and endeavour, which, though ineffectual of itself, is rendered successful by the assistance of the Divine mercy. But if they would soberly examine the subject there treated by Paul, they would not so inconsiderately pervert this passage. I know that they can allege the suffrages of Origen and Jerome in defence of their exposition; and in opposition to them, I could produce that of Augustine. But their opinions are of no importance to us if we can ascertain what was the meaning of Paul. He is there teaching, that salvation is provided for them alone, whom the Lord favours with his mercy; but that ruin and perdition await all those whom he has not chosen. He had shown, by the example of Pharaoh, the condition of the reprobate; and had confirmed the certainty of gratuitous election by the testimony of Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.” His conclusion is, that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” If this be understood to imply that our will and endeavour are not sufficient, because they are not equal to so great a work, Paul has expressed himself with great impropriety. Away, therefore, with these sophisms: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth;” therefore there is some willing and some running. For the meaning of Paul is more simple—It is neither our willing nor our running, which procures for us a way of salvation, but solely the mercy of God. For he expresses here the same sentiment as he does to Titus, when he says, “that the kindness and love of God towards man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy.”729 The very persons, who argue that Paul, in denying that it is of him that willeth or of him that runneth, implies that there is some willing and some running, would not allow me to use the same mode of reasoning, that we have done some good works, because Paul denies that we have obtained the favour of God by any works which we have done. But if they perceive a flaw in this argumentation, let them open their eyes, and they will perceive a similar fallacy in their own. For the argument on which Augustine rests the dispute is unanswerable: “If it be said, that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, merely because neither our willing nor our running is sufficient, it may, on the contrary, be retorted, that it is not of the mercy of God, because that does not act alone.”730 The latter position being absurd, Augustine justly concludes the meaning of this passage to be, that there is no good will in man, unless it be prepared by the Lord; not but that we ought to will and to run, but because God works in us both the one and the other. With similar want of judgment, some pervert this declaration of Paul, “We are labourers together with God;”731 which, without doubt, is restricted solely to ministers, who are denominated “workers with him,” not that they contribute any thing of themselves, but because God makes use of their agency, after he has qualified them and furnished them with the necessary talents.

XVIII. They produce a passage from Ecclesiasticus, which is well known to be a book of doubtful authority. But though we should not reject it, which, nevertheless, if we chose, we might justly do, what testimony does it afford in support of free will? The writer says, that man, as soon as he was created, was left in the power of his own will; that precepts were given to him, which if he kept, he should also be kept by them; that he had life and death, good and evil, set before him; and that whatever he desired, would be given him.732 Let it be granted, that man at his creation was endowed with a power of choosing life or death. What if we reply, that he has lost it? I certainly do not intend to contradict Solomon, who asserts that “God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.”733 But man, by his degeneracy, having shipwrecked both himself and all his excellences, whatever is attributed to his primitive state, it does not immediately follow that it belongs to his vitiated and degenerated nature. Therefore I reply, not only to them, but also to Ecclesiasticus himself, whoever he be: If you design to teach man to seek within himself a power to attain salvation, your authority is not so great in our estimation as to obtain even the smallest degree of credit, in opposition to the undoubted word of God. But if you only aim to repress the malignity of the flesh, which vainly attempts to vindicate itself by transferring its crimes to God, and you therefore reply, that man was originally endued with rectitude, from which it is evident that he was the cause of his own ruin, I readily assent to it; provided we also agree in this, that through his own guilt he is now despoiled of those ornaments with which God invested him at the beginning; and so unite in confessing, that in his present situation he needs not an advocate, but a physician.