John Codman Ropes - The Battle of Waterloo

We must, therefore, bear in mind, first, that Wellington thought it likely that Napoleon would advance, if he advanced at all, by way of Mons, or to the westward of it, and, secondly, that he thought his own army was well placed to meet such an advance. In fact we may go further, and say that Wellington having this opinion about the line which the French would probably take, felt it all the more necessary to retain his troops in their existing positions, from which they could, as he judged, easily be assembled to meet such an attack, because he saw clearly that no assistance, certainly no immediate assistance, could be expected from the Prussians, in such an emergency, so remote were they from the Mons-Brussels route. If Napoleon was to be met or baffled in such a movement it must be by the Anglo-Dutch army. And the Duke also saw with equal clearness that nothing could serve the purpose of the French, if they were making their main attack by way of Mons, better than a premature movement of the Anglo-Dutch army towards Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, by which the communications of that army would be exposed throughout their whole length. Hence it was to be expected that the Duke would be most careful not to make such a premature movement, and, therefore, that he would insist on being convinced that the main French attack was by way of Charleroi before doing more than effecting the assembling of his scattered troops at their respective places of rendezvous.

It so happened that the Prince of Orange, who commanded, as we have said, the 1st Corps, left his headquarters at Braine-le-Comte early on the morning of the 15th, rode to the outposts, heard some firing in the direction of Thuin, a village some ten miles west of Charleroi, and then rode straight to Brussels152 without stopping on his way at his own headquarters. During his absence153 reports had been forwarded to him from Generals Dörnberg and Behr, who were at Mons, to the effect that all was quiet in their front, and from Van Merlen, whose command lay a little to the eastward of Mons, that Steinmetz’s Prussian brigade had been attacked early in the morning154 and that the enemy’s movements seemed to be directed on Charleroi. These reports remained some hours at the Prince’s headquarters, and were then forwarded to the Duke at Brussels, where they arrived in the evening. But before that time, in fact by or before 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the Prince himself had arrived, bringing his own report, which was a very indefinite one, and which was to the effect that the enemy had attacked the Prussian outposts near Thuin. This was the first information which the Duke received of the outbreak of hostilities.155 About the same time, also, a dispatch156 sent by Zieten to Müffling arrived, announcing that he had been attacked before Charleroi.

Wellington gave sufficient credence to these reports to issue orders157 for the immediate concentration of the different divisions158 at the points designated for them respectively, and for their being in readiness to march at a moment’s notice, but waited till further reports from Mons should come in before doing more.159 These orders were despatched between five and seven o’clock.160

They provided simply, as we have said above, for the assembling of the various divisions of the army at certain convenient places. There is, however, one passage in these orders that requires attention. Alten’s division—the third British division—had been directed in the first part of the order to assemble at Braine-le-Comte, but it was further ordered to march to Nivelles (where the two Dutch-Belgian divisions of Chassé and Perponcher had been directed to assemble), if Nivelles had been attacked during the 15th, yet not until it should be found “quite certain that the enemy’s attack is upon the right of the Prussian army and the left of the British army.”161 This concentration of three divisions of infantry with cavalry and artillery, say about 25,000 men, at Nivelles, seven miles west of Quatre Bras, was thus the only provision made in this first order or set of orders for the contingency of the French attack being made on the lines on which it actually was made; and it would seem to be a legitimate inference from this arrangement that Nivelles, and not Quatre Bras, had been selected by Wellington as the point of concentration for his army in case Napoleon advanced by way of Charleroi. In this connection it is important to note that in a letter dated 7 P.M., but probably not sent off till midnight, Müffling wrote to Blücher that the Duke would be in the morning in the region of Nivelles with his whole force.162

Later in the evening, a despatch from Blücher to Müffling, sent from Namur, arrived,163 announcing the concentration of the Prussian army at Sombreffe, and requesting Müffling

“To give him speedy intelligence of the concentration of Wellington’s army. I immediately,” says Müffling, “communicated this to the Duke, who quite acquiesced in Blücher’s dispositions. However, he could not resolve on fixing his point of concentration before receiving the expected news from Mons.”

This information from Blücher, however, induced the Duke to issue, about ten o’clock in the evening,164 a second set of orders, having for their object a general movement of the army towards the east.165 Alten’s division was now positively ordered to Nivelles; Cooke’s division of guards, which had been ordered to collect at Ath, some thirteen miles south-west of its headquarters at Enghien, was now ordered on Braine-le-Comte, eight miles south-east of Enghien; and the second and fourth divisions, and the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which constituted the extreme right of the army and had been cantoned between Ath and Audenarde on the Scheldt, were now ordered to Enghien. Enghien is about eight miles north-west of Braine-le-Comte, which is about nine miles west of Nivelles, which in its turn is about seven miles west of Quatre Bras. No orders were issued to the reserves.

Up to this point we can go by the records. But here we encounter serious difficulties in the evidence. Everybody knows that, somehow or other, the Duke of Wellington collected the next day at Quatre Bras a considerable part of his army. We also know that it has been claimed that during the night of the 15th and 16th the Duke ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras. We shall presently have occasion to describe how the Dutch-Belgian troops got there without his orders; but our task now is to examine the orders which Wellington gave after the despatch of those the substance of which has just been given, and his Report of the campaign, and also his own doings on the morning of the 16th, and see what light these documents and doings throw upon the statements and claims which have been made and set up in his behalf.

The Duke’s official report,166 dated Waterloo, June 19th, seems to contain express reference to three sets of orders.

“I did not hear,” he says, “of these events [the French attack on the Prussian posts on the Sambre] till in the evening of the 15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march,” that is, by the orders which were sent off between 5 and 7 o’clock P.M., “and afterwards,” that is, by the orders issued at 10 o’clock, “to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy’s movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.”

Then, after stating how the Prince of Orange reinforced the brigade of Prince Bernhard at Quatre Bras, and had, early in the morning of the 16th, regained part of the ground which had been lost the evening before, he goes on to say:—

“In the meantime,”—that is to say, before the “early morning,”—“I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras.”167

Müffling says168 that, towards midnight,169 the Duke entered his room, and said: