Andrew Radford - Linguistics An Introduction [Second Edition]

Using sentences

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Here, if (520a) is true, then (520c) must also be true, i.e. (520a) entails (520c). But it might also be suggested that (520b), the negation of (520a), entails (520c), and this is a very different pattern to what we see in (519). The constellation of entailments we have just described for (520) illustrates the relation of logical presupposition, and a general definition of this appears in (521): (521) A sentence S1 logically presupposes a sentences S2 if and only if:

(a)

S1 entails S2

(b)

the negation of S1 entails S2

Now, supposing that (520a) logically presupposes (520c), we can ask what the truth-value of (520a) is in circumstances where (520c) is false. It is easy to see that in such circumstances, (520a) is neither true nor false, since (520c) is entailed by both (520a) and its negation (520b). If (520a) were true, then (520c) would be true; if (520a) were false, then (520b), the negation of (520a), would be true and (520c)

would also be true. But we are supposing that (520c) is false, and it follows that (520a) can be neither true nor false in these circumstances.

Are there cases of logical presupposition, as defined above, in language? The commonly held view is that there are not because, in general, sentences such as (520b) do not entail sentences like (520c). Notice that if this entailment obtained, it should not be possible for (520c) to be false in circumstances where (520b) is true. But this requires that (522) is a contradiction:

(522)

Tom didn’t stop reading the book; in fact, he never even started it

And it is clear, we maintain, that (522) is not contradictory.

Suppose, then, that logical presupposition is not a useful descriptive notion in the study of natural language. The fact remains that there is something odd about an utterance of (520b) in circumstances where the truth of (520c) is not assumed.

This gives rise to a somewhat looser notion of presupposition, sometimes called pragmatic presupposition, where the truth of a presupposed proposition must

normally be assumed or taken for granted if a presupposing proposition is to be readily intelligible. Thus, we can now maintain that (520b) (along with 520a) pragmatically presupposes (520c), since someone uttering (520b) would normally be taking the truth of (520c) for granted. From this perspective, what is unusual about (522) is that it makes it clear that the normal situation governing the utterance of the first clause is not in place.

The notion of pragmatic presupposition, understood as above, is prevalent in language use, extending to function words and even entire constructions. Thus, consider (523):

(523)

Harriet fed the cat

We can readily see that an utterance of this sentence would be odd (infelicitous) if Harriet owned more than one cat (and the addressee knew she did), and on this basis we may wish to suggest that use of such phrases as the X is associated with the pragmatic presupposition that speaker and addressee are familiar with only one

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X in the circumstances. Obviously, we would not wish to say, however, that a multiplicity of Harriet’s cats suffices to make an utterance of (523) false.

Likewise, (524) would be infelicitous if Harriet didn’t actually feed (any of) the cats, even if she had several cats and one of them was a ginger tom.

(524)

One of the cats that Harriet fed was a ginger tom

This is because the expression one of the cats that Harriet fed in (524) presupposes that Harriet fed at least two cats. If we negate (524) and consider One of the cats that Harriet fed wasn’t a ginger tom, this presupposition remains.

The type of presupposition we have been considering here is independent of

information structure, being linked instead to the meaning of individual words and constructions. It is important to keep these different senses of the term in mind in considering accounts of sentence use.

Doing things with words

Around the middle of the twentieth century, the Oxford philosopher

John Austin made a simple but very important point about examples such as (525) and (526):

(525)

I want to read your new book

(526)

I promise to read your new book

In uttering (525), speakers are simply registering a desire, while in uttering

(526), they are committing themselves to doing something, namely reading the book. Just uttering (526) in appropriate circumstances constitutes a promise, and Austin designated examples such as (526) performatives. Further examples appear in (527), with the performative verbs in italics: (527) a.

I order you to complete the exercise

b.

I assure you of my loyalty

c.

I hereby conclude that the earth is flat

Austin’s work sparked interest in the way that we can use language to perform certain types of act, speech acts.

English, like many languages, tends to distinguish certain broad classes of speech act in its grammatical system, mood being the traditional term for designating the relevant grammatical types. Thus, we have the correspondences set out in (528):

(528)

Speech act

Mood

a.

John has read Mary’s book

Statement

Declarative

b.

Read Mary’s book

Command

Imperative

c.

Has John read Mary’s book?

Question

Interrogative

However, there are other types of speech act that don’t correspond to grammati-calised categories of this sort, for instance, suggestions, illustrated by (529):

Using sentences

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(529)

Why don’t you read Mary’s book?

Of course, (529) can be used to ask a question, but forms such as this are much more commonly used to make suggestions. Indeed, mismatches between the

speech-act types in (528) and the standard way of expressing such speech acts are common, and this was one of the first topics in ancient and medieval

linguistics (studied under the heading of ‘rhetoric’). Here are some simple

examples:

(530)

Since when has John been able to speak Japanese?

Meaning: ‘John has never been able to speak Japanese’

Type: Interrogative Mood used to make a statement – a rhetorical question

(531)

Could you make a little less noise in there?

Meaning: ‘Make less noise in there’

Type: Interrogative Mood used to issue a command

(532)

The hat stand goes by the front door (to furniture removers)

Meaning: ‘Put the hat stand by the front door’

Type: Declarative Mood used to issue a command

(533)

I’m afraid I don’t know your name

Meaning: ‘What’s your name?’

Type: Declarative Mood used to ask a question

There are also more complex instances of mismatch between form and function, as in (534), where the imperative mood is typically interpreted as a conditional statement, ‘If you do that once more, I will hit you’, and certainly not as an imperative:

(534)

Do that once more and I’ll hit you!

Speech acts of this sort in which the usual interpretation expected in conversation is at odds with the literal interpretation are often called indirect speech acts. Thus, to take an example, the interrogative form in (531) can be used literally to perform the direct speech act of asking a question but typically will be used to perform the indirect speech act of issuing a command

The logic of conversation

Consider the following four examples of language in use:

(535) a.

We’ve had the most wonderful weather!

(written on a postcard reporting on a vacation marred by continual wind, rain and storms):

b.

The weather could have been better

(written on postcard reporting the same vacation as in a):

c.

speaker a: Was the President lying?