Constantine Pleshakov - The Crimean Nexus

One of the few reputable enterprises is Massandra Winery, founded in 1894, some say at the behest of Tsar Nicholas II. The “reunification” made Massandra workers so happy that they painted a forklift with the colors of the Russian flag, but it did little for the winery’s sales. Massandra wines are about as popular on world markets as Scottish haggis. They belong to the category of fortified wines—sherry, port, madeira, drinks whose heyday is long past and whose very limited connoisseur market is largely owned by Portugal and Spain. Energized by what they saw as new opportunities, the Massandra winemakers announced that their product was special because it was fortified with beetroot ethanol, not grape brandy like in Europe. But instead of getting showered with orders from London and New York, their sales in Russia plummeted: Russian epicures were horrified to discover that all those decades they had been drinking glorified moonshine. Within a year, Crimean wine sales were off by 61 percent. [6] Neil MacFarquhar, “Crimean Vineyards of Last Czar Withstand Time and Tumult,” New York Times , May 28, 2014; “Vina krymskoi ‘Massandry’ v Rossii nazvali vinnym napitkom,” Ekonomicheskaya Pravda , May 28, 2014, www.epravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/05/28/458777 (retrieved July 5, 2014); “V Krymu prekratil rabotu vinnyi zavod ‘Solnechnaya Dolina’,” Novosti Kryma , February 15, 2015, http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2015/2/15/v-krymu-prekratil-rabotu-vinnyi-zavod-solnechnaya-dolina-31344 (retrieved February 15, 2015).

Crimean agriculture plummeted as well. Irrigation, credit, and exports became difficult, if not impossible to secure. The leader of the Crimea Farmers Association dryly commented: “On a scale of one to five, we are at negative three.” [7] Neil MacFarquhar, “Aid Elusive, Crimea Farms Face Hurdles,” New York Times , July 8, 2014.

Moscow recklessly sanctioned the reapportioning of property on the peninsula. According to a recent New York Times correspondent’s estimate, more than $1 billion in “real estate and other assets have been stripped from their former owners,” including “banks, hotels, shipyards, farms, gas stations.” The victims of confiscation maintain that the Crimean government received “carte blanche” from Moscow to fund its budget by whatever means available. Calling the confiscations “nationalization,” the authorities focused on property belonging to Ukrainians—both oligarchs and small businesses—but Russian-owned enterprises were not necessarily spared. “Nationalization” of that kind heralds a long period of seizure of the spoils of annexation, with economic growth the least of anyone’s worries. [8] Neil MacFarquhar, “Seizing Assets in Crimea, from Shipyard to Film Studio,” New York Times , January 10, 2015.

Violating E.U. sanctions, on September 17, 2014, the Greek cruise liner Ocean Majesty , chartered by a German tourist agency, dropped anchor at Yalta. As the first European ship to visit the peninsula since the annexation, it caused a media splash. Only 330 of the 436 tourists on board dared to go ashore. But the visit did not augur a return to normalcy: in December 2014, the European Union imposed a ban on E.U. cruise ships visiting Crimean ports. [9] “Priplyli: Yalta prelstila ne vsekh nemetskikh turistov,” Town of Yalta site, September 23, 2014, www.0654.com.ua/article/625700 (retrieved September 29, 2014).

The new set of sanctions was aimed not at Russia but at Crimea. European businesses were prohibited from investing in or trading with the peninsula. Energy and telecommunications deals were specifically prohibited. In a coordinated move, a day later the White House also introduced sanctions against the peninsula. President Obama said the goal was “to provide clarity to U.S. corporations doing business in the region and reaffirm that the United States will not accept Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea.” The U.S. Treasury Department placed new restrictions on Crimean companies and individuals supporting the separatist cause. Among the latter were members of the Night Wolves motorcycle group, who had been prominent during the takeover. Predictably, that had the Sevastopol bikers howling with joy about the free publicity and mockingly challenging the U.S. government to punish them more. [10] Laurence Norman and Frances Robinson, “EU Toughens Sanctions on Crimea-Based Companies,” Wall Street Journal , December 18, 2014; “Obama to Block Exports of Goods, Technology, Services to Crimea,” Reuters, December 19, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-ukraine-crisis-obama-idUSKBN0JX2DG20141219 (retrieved December 20, 2014).

The local and regional elections in Crimea and Sevastopol in September 2014 could not be dismissed as a sham. The results were real, and they demonstrated continuing support for Moscow and Putin. The turnout was 53.6 percent, which was very high: city elections held in Moscow the same day saw turnout of just 20.2 percent. Twelve parties had participated in the campaign, but only two won any seats. Out of 75 new members of the Crimean State Council, 70 represented Putin’s United Russia party, and 5 were from the right-wing party known as LDPR. Again, the Crimea proved far more conservative than the capital, where United Russia won only 28 seats out of 45 and the LDPR 1. [11] “Izbirkomy Kryma i Sevastopolya utverdili ofitsialnye rezultaty vyborov,” Russkaya sluzhba novostei, September 16, 2014, www.rusnovosti.ru/news/341297 (retrieved September 16, 2014); “Yavka na vyborakh v Mosgordumu sostavila okolo 20%,” Argumenty i fakty , September 15, 2014, www.aif.ru/politics/russia/1337910 (retrieved September 16, 2014); “Mosgorizbirkom utverdil rezultaty vyborov v Moskovskuyu gorodskuyu dumu VI sozyva,” ITAR-TASS, September 16, 2014, http://itar-tass.com/politika/1445988 (retrieved September 16, 2014).

The majority of Crimean Tatars boycotted the vote.

So far, Crimea has been spared the horrors of the civil war—by good luck rather than good management. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic plunge Crimea is taking promises social unrest. And then there is the Tatar “problem.”

Because Tatars returned to Crimea in the 1990s as squatters, they are now required to “renegotiate” lease and property rights with the Russian government—a road to immense abuse and predictable injustice. The founders of the Crimean Tatar national movement plainly refuse to participate in the Russian state in any manner. In retaliation, Russian authorities have banned their leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, from Crimea. They have also threatened to end the “dual power” on the peninsula if the Tatars’ legislative bodies, the Qurultai and Mejlis, refuse to recognize the annexation. Meanwhile, Moscow promoted a loyalist Tatar movement, Kirim, led by Remzi Ilyasov, a former vice-chairman of Mejlis. With Crimean Tatars, Putin was attempting what Americans had been trying to achieve in Afghanistan and Iraq for over a decade: foster a friendly force.

Exiled to Kiev, Dzhemilev responded to Moscow’s threats by saying that if they were carried out, he would take Tatar power structures underground. Until then, he pointed out, the struggle of the Tatars had been executed by peaceful means; now all options were on the table. [12] “Dzhemilev zayavlyaet, chto Medzhlis mozhet uiti v podpolye v Krymu,” Finance.ua, May 9, 2014, http://news.finance.ua/ru/news/-/325148/dzhemilev-zayavlyaet-chto-medzhlis-mozhet-ujti-v-podpole-v-krymu (retrieved August 21, 2015).

Dzhemilev’s Russian opponents do not appear to understand how incredibly lucky they are that he is the Crimean Tatar leader. For twenty years, he has been restraining the radicals within the movement. Nor do the Russians seem to acknowledge that an intercommunal conflict spreads like wildfire. It does not take many hotheads to turn a territory into a Beirut or a Sarajevo.