Michael Leinbach - Bringing Columbia Home - The Untold Story of a Lost Space Shuttle and Her Crew

I can recall post- Columbia program-level meetings where we could not adjourn until at least one dissenting opinion was presented. It was a little awkward, but it was the right thing to do—to really show the team we meant what we said about open discussions.

Implementing the space shuttle safety recommendations took two years. Meanwhile, the International Space Station remained manned, albeit with small crews who launched to and returned from the ISS aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft.

Eileen Collins and her crew trained for the “return to flight” STS-114 mission of Discovery , which would take a logistics module loaded with cargo to the station. The crew’s primary mission, however, was to demonstrate improvements in shuttle safety.

Collins had intended that her mission—originally scheduled for March 2003—would be her final one. She planned to retire from the astronaut corps that summer and move to Florida with her husband, who was a pilot for Delta Airlines. When the Columbia accident occurred, she knew that her plans would have to change. “It would just look bad if the commander of the next mission retired, no matter what the reason. People would think I had lost faith or was worried about my safety,” she said. “I was not going to do that to NASA, no matter what my personal plans were, because I had confidence we could fly our mission just fine.”

NASA invited Roger and Belinda Gay, Marsha Cooper, Terry Lane, and many of the people from East Texas who had been so helpful in the Columbia recovery effort to come to KSC and witness Discovery ’s launch. It would be a fitting tribute for these people to see the shuttle fly again as a result of their hard work and sacrifices. The group toured Kennedy’s facilities, but their hope to see the shuttle lift off were dashed when a fuel tank sensor problem scrubbed the planned July 13, 2005, launch. They had to return home before our next launch attempt.

We could not locate the cause of the sensor problem. After a week, engineers determined it was not critical to flight safety, so we set a new launch date of July 26.

As the countdown came out of the T minus nine–minute hold, I cleared Discovery for launch and told the crew, “On behalf of the many millions of people who believe so deeply in what we do—good luck, Godspeed, and have a little fun up there!”

Discovery finally lifted off the launchpad—907 days after the Columbia accident.

Trouble ensued almost immediately.

A large bird struck the fuel tank less than three seconds after liftoff—which fortunately caused no damage to the vehicle. A small piece of tile fell off the edge of the shuttle’s nose landing gear door some time before the solid rocket boosters separated. One edge of a thermal blanket under the commander’s cockpit window also came loose. And to everyone’s horror, the external tank shed several large pieces of foam, one of which was about half the size of the piece that fatally wounded Columbia. The largest piece fortunately missed Discovery , but another piece of foam struck the shuttle’s right wing.

On-orbit inspection of Discovery ’s heatshield revealed only minimal damage. Wind tunnel tests showed that the loose insulation blanket would not cause a problem. However, the extent of foam shedding from the external tank was absolutely unacceptable, since the issue had supposedly been fixed.

While Discovery was still in space, NASA declared a moratorium on future shuttle flights until the foam shedding problem was resolved.

The mission itself went smoothly. Discovery docked with the ISS and delivered much-needed cargo and supplies. In three space walks, the crew demonstrated shuttle tile repair techniques, replaced a failed gyroscope on the ISS, and installed an external stowage platform for ISS tools and equipment. Then astronaut Stephen Robinson conducted an actual repair on the shuttle, removing two gap fillers that were protruding from between tiles on Discovery ’s belly. It was the first time an astronaut had ever ventured underneath the shuttle during a space walk. “Other than the launch, that was the riskiest thing we did on this mission, because we hadn’t trained for it,” Collins said.

Columbia ’s crew remained in the hearts and minds of the return-to-flight mission. The STS-114 crew had redesigned their crew patch to incorporate the STS-107 mission emblem. Collins kept a photo of the Columbia crew on display in Discovery ’s flight deck throughout the mission. “Whenever we were up on the flight deck, we had that crew with us,” she said.

On August 3, the shuttle and ISS crews gathered to send birthday greetings to Matthew Husband, son of Columbia ’s late commander. The crews also read a short memorial service composed by astronaut Andy Thomas, entitled “Exploration—The fire of the human spirit, a tribute to fallen astronauts and cosmonauts.” [13] Andrew Thomas, “Exploration—To the Fire of the Human Spirit: A Tribute to Fallen Astronauts and Cosmonauts,” August 4, 2005, https://www.nasa.gov/returntoflight/crew/sts114_exp11_tribute.html . Collins concluded the service saying, “For all our lost colleagues, we leave you with this prayer, often spoken for those who have sacrificed themselves for all of us:

Discovery was supposed to land at Kennedy Space Center on August 8. Bad weather at KSC forced NASA to wave off two landing opportunities that day and two the next day. NASA finally directed Discovery to land at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

Collins and her crew felt absolutely confident about the final phase of flight after the extensive inspections they conducted during the mission. “As a habit, I called out Mach numbers so that the astronauts in the mid-deck knew where we were in the reentry profile,” she said. “None of us said anything about it, but we were all aware when we passed the airspeed and altitude where Columbia had her accident.” Collins brought Discovery in for a landing and called “Wheels stop” at 8:12 Eastern Time on the morning of August 9, 2005.

A month later, Hurricane Katrina slammed into New Orleans. [14] FEMA’s Scott Wells and Mark Stanford of the Texas Forest Service, among many others who participated in the Columbia recovery, were also involved in responding to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While lessons learned from the Columbia operation actually improved the coordination among many of the agencies during the Katrina response, leadership breakdowns in other areas is a topic best discussed elsewhere. Shuttle external tank assembly operations at NASA’s nearby Michoud Assembly Facility were suspended for nearly two months while NASA repaired wind and water damage to the facility. In November, NASA inspected one of the external tanks that had twice been filled with and drained of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. New scanning techniques revealed cracks deep in the insulating foam that were not visible on the surface. It appeared the foam cracked as the tank contracted and expanded due to thermal changes. NASA realized that it was an engineering issue—not human error in applying the foam—which had caused the foam shedding problem. [15] Warren Leary, “Cracks Found in Protective Foam on an Unused Shuttle Fuel Tank,” New York Times , November 23, 2005. Shuttle Program Manager Wayne Hale said shortly thereafter, “I flew to New Orleans within a few days, and called an all-hands meeting where I publicly apologized to the foam technicians. They had not caused the loss of Columbia through poor workmanship. Those guys were reeling from the hurricane’s devastation to their homes and community, and had lived with nearly three years of blame.” [16] Wayne Hale, “How We Nearly Lost Discovery ,” Wayne Hale’s Blog , April 18, 2012, https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/ . NASA could now make the needed design changes to the tank.