Norman Stone - The Atlantic and Its Enemies

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After World War II, the former allies were saddled with a devastated world economy and traumatized populace. Soviet influence spread insidiously from nation to nation, and the Atlantic powers—the Americans, the British, and a small band of allies—were caught flat-footed by the coups, collapsing armies, and civil wars that sprung from all sides. The Cold War had begun in earnest.
In
, prize-winning historian Norman Stone assesses the years between World War II and the collapse of the Iron Curtain. He vividly demonstrates that for every Atlantic success there seemed to be a dozen Communist or Third World triumphs. Then, suddenly and against all odds, the Atlantic won—economically, ideologically, and militarily—with astonishing speed and finality.
An elegant and path-breaking history,
is a monument to the immense suffering and conflict of the twentieth century, and an illuminating exploration of how the Atlantic triumphed over its enemies at last.

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In any case, the collapse of the French position in Indo-China showed what might happen: Dien Bien Phu was rapidly followed by a revolt in Algeria, which started with a characteristic atrocity on All Saints’ Day. On 1 November, La Voix des Arabes from Cairo announced, ‘Today, on the fifth day of the month of Rabii of the year 1374… at one o’clock in the morning, Algeria has begun to live an honourable life… A powerful group of free children of Algeria has started the insurrection of freedom against the tyrannical French imperialism in North Africa.’ What had happened was that, in a remote part of the country, a bus had been ambushed, a protesting village headman machine-gunned, a French schoolteacher shot dead and his wife badly wounded. The ambushers waited around for a while, in order to shoot any rescuers who arrived, but since none did, they left. The French followed this with severe repression, harassed relatively moderate Algerians, dropped bombs, and sent in troops who were only too anxious to avenge the defeat in Vietnam (where the French lost some 90,000 men). Mendès France had been sensible over Vietnam but even he reacted, in the first instance, with an ‘Ici c’est la France.’ But it was not so simple. Now, the ‘National Liberation Front’ was in a much stronger position than had been Algerian rebels in the old days, when Foreign Legionaries could romantically hold desert forts against camel-riding raiders. Several of the rebels had fought in the French army; arms could be supplied across the Tunisian border, or even as it turned out from Yugoslavia, where Tito was in full leader-of-unaligned mode; Nasser was bidding for leadership of the Arab world; and the Americans especially were not in sympathy with French colonization (on a later occasion, the American cultural centre in Algiers was burned down by enraged pieds noirs ). Algiers itself was the scene of a foul battle in 1957, when random terrorists provoked retribution, and the French parachutists, under an implacable general, Jacques Émile Massu, restored order. One method was torture. By 1958 the army had in its way won, but the cost was enormous — in fact, a degree of hatred between the two sides (and among the Algerians themselves) that made a solution impossible. The pieds noirs were possessed of a collective rage, and so was much of the army. Meanwhile in Paris the politicians, facing condemnation even from allies, were facing the headache of paying for the unending war, and some of them knew that in an era of decolonization there were other ways of saving France’s position in Algeria. Oil had been discovered in the Sahara and that could be obtained easily enough through collaboration with an independent Algeria. In mid-April one government fell and a moderate, Pierre Pflimlin, took the succession. At the very hint of compromise, Algiers exploded. On 13 May the pieds noirs , who all along felt that metropolitan governments were not nearly harsh enough against the rebels, struck; the governor-general’s palace was stormed and sacked; parts of the army clearly sympathized; even, Massu was asked to set up a ‘Committee of Public Safety’, an emergency institution that went back to the days of the great Revolution when France had been invaded. A few days later, a parachute unit from Algeria seized the island of Corsica. There was strong pressure in Paris for a return of de Gaulle, the supreme national figure, and the Algerian French supposed that he would impose an Algérie française . There were enormous demonstrations in Algiers (in which a great number of Moslems joined: as ever, in such situations, the Algerian revolt was itself a civil war, and even more Moslems were killed by Moslems than by the French, whose own losses — 30,000 — were surprisingly limited for an eight-year war of this savagery).

The crisis in Algeria and the threat of an army putsch against the government itself at least put an end to the preposterous government crisis. De Gaulle had been thinking. The almost universal belief was that the colonial crises were causing the paralysis of the State. De Gaulle came to the belief that this order should be reversed — that the institutions had to be radically changed for some sensible solution to these interminable conflicts to be found, as after all the British had, more or less, managed. Vietnam stood in very stark contrast to Malaya, where the British had had to fight a long and difficult war but had been very careful to cultivate local allies who were essential to the winning of it. The fact was that a great many of the politicians more or less agreed that the institutions were absurd, and asked only to be put out of their misery in a dignified way. There was some screeching alarmism. The president of the Council of Europe, a standard-issue Belgian socialist, set the tone for many such pronouncements in the future and announced that ‘I am struck by the analogy between the Algiers insurrection and the beginnings of Franco in Spain.’ Some French opponents, and the official Communist Party, spread alarms as to a new version of the Second Empire or even of Vichy France. To that, de Gaulle had an easy answer: he was sixty-seven, not an age at which a man aspires to be dictator. In fact he was soon joined by great numbers of politicians from several parties. He agreed, for form’s sake, to address the existing assembly, did so briefly and to the point: there was crisis in everything. A new constitution was needed, with a strong executive. He was given full powers. A referendum in September endorsed what he did, and the ‘yes’ vote included about one third of the Communists’ usual number.

Changing constitutions — as French experience showed — is not always worth the effort. As Benjamin Constant, one of the many wise defeated liberals whom France produced, remarked, ‘on change de situation mais on transporte dans chacune les tourments dont on espérait se délivrer’. But in this case the constitution also represented a France that was becoming very different indeed from the France of the nineteenth century and of the interwar period. There were children; the rural masses were being broken up; industry could develop even with German competition and there were new sources of energy to supplement France’s none-too-many and none-too-rich coal mines. The historic problem, that the Right was divided, was being overcome. With de Gaulle, a conservative element became united enough at last to form a stable government (though the name of the party changed, over and over again, from UNR (Union pour la Nouvelle République) to RPR (Jacques Chirac’s Rassemblement pour la République) and whatever). It had its dissidents, but the power of the presidency was such that the spoils of office which had made governments so unstable before were now transferred in effect to the Élysée Palace and a coterie round presidents. Spoils of office remained, but at least there was governmental continuity.

Given as much, the Algerian problem was solved in so far as its abolition can be described as a solution: the pieds noirs , almost all of them, left in 1962. When he went to Algeria, de Gaulle had given a strong impression that he would fight for Algérie française , and he proclaimed economic measures that would contain some of the disastrous unemployment that came partly from the sheer terror of the war, and partly from the demographic explosion on the Moslem side. But after a year he was outlining a new policy: Algeria for the Algerians. At that, the army started to rebel again and de Gaulle produced another of his masterpieces: a television address — he practised his quite extraordinary style with much care, to be fondly remembered ever after by caricaturists — in which he began, ‘Eh bien, mon cher et vieux pays’, appealing for popular support. The army leaders were isolated in Algiers, much of the army dissociating itself, and they backed down. In control, de Gaulle could now move towards a settlement with the Algerian rebels, with whom there had been secret negotiations in Switzerland. He could always threaten that, if they went too far, the country could be partitioned, the French retaining a coastal strip. In the event, in July 1962, France recognized Algeria, retaining some rights over the Sahara oil. There had been a final outburst from the unrelenting elements in the army, four senior figures carrying out a putsch in 1961 and then going underground, striking out brutally and almost at random. But they had no future: nor perhaps did they want or expect one. In the summer of 1962, under a broiling sun, a million French settlers now left, leaving Algeria to an unhappy future.

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