Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

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The Sword and the Shield: краткое содержание, описание и аннотация

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The Sword and the Shield Vasili Mitrokhin, a secret dissident who worked in the KGB archive, smuggled out copies of its most highly classified files every day for twelve years. In 1992, a U.S. ally succeeded in exfiltrating the KGB officer and his entire archive out of Moscow. The archive covers the entire period from the Bolshevik Revolution to the 1980s and includes revelations concerning almost every country in the world. But the KGB’s main target, of course, was the United States.
Though there is top-secret material on almost every country in the world, the United States is at the top of the list. As well as containing many fascinating revelations, this is a major contribution to the secret history of the twentieth century.
Among the topics and revelations explored are:
• The KGB’s covert operations in the United States and throughout the West, some of which remain dangerous today.
• KGB files on Oswald and the JFK assassination that Boris Yeltsin almost certainly has no intention of showing President Clinton.
• The KGB’s attempts to discredit civil rights leader in the 1960s, including its infiltration of the inner circle of a key leader.
• The KGB’s use of radio intercept posts in New York and Washington, D.C., in the 1970s to intercept high-level U.S. government communications.
• The KGB’s attempts to steal technological secrets from major U.S. aerospace and technology corporations.
• KGB covert operations against former President Ronald Reagan, which began five years before he became president.
• KGB spies who successfully posed as U.S. citizens under a series of ingenious disguises, including several who attained access to the upper echelons of New York society.

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Stalin was much less suspicious of Adolf Hitler than of Winston Churchill, the evil genius who had preached an anti-Bolshevik crusade in the civil war twenty years earlier and had been plotting against the Soviet Union ever since. Behind many of the reports of impending German attack Stalin claimed to detect a disinformation campaign by Churchill designed to continue the long-standing British plot to embroil him with Hitler. Churchill’s personal warnings to Stalin of preparations for BARBAROSSA only heightened his suspicions. From the intelligence reports sent by the London residency, Stalin almost certainly knew that until June 1941 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the body responsible for the main British intelligence assessments, did not believe that Hitler was preparing an invasion. It reported to Churchill as late as May 23 that “the advantages… to Germany of concluding an agreement with the USSR are overwhelming.” 25The JIC assessments were probably regarded by Stalin as further proof that Churchill’s warnings were intended to deceive him. Stalin’s deep suspicions of Churchill and of British policy in general were cleverly exploited by the Germans. As part of the deception operation which preceded BARBAROSSA, the Abwehr, German military intelligence, spread reports that rumors of an impending German attack were part of a British disinformation campaign.

By early June, reports of German troop movements toward the Soviet frontier were too numerous to be explained, even by Stalin, simply as British disinformation. At a private lunch in the German embassy in Moscow, the ambassador, Count von der Schulenberg, revealed that Hitler had definitely decided on invasion. “You will ask me why I am doing this,” he said to the astonished Soviet ambassador to Germany, Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov. “I was raised in the spirit of Bismarck, who was always an opponent of war with Russia.” Stalin’s response was to tell the Politburo, “Disinformation has now reached ambassadorial level!” 26On June 9, or soon afterwards, however, Stalin received a report that the German embassy had been sent orders by telegram to prepare for evacuation within a week and had begun burning documents in the basement. 27

Though Stalin remained preoccupied by a non-existent British conspiracy, he increasingly began to suspect a German plot as well—though not one which aimed at surprise attack. As it became ever more difficult to conceal German troop movements, the Abwehr spread rumors that Hitler was preparing to issue an ultimatum, backed by some display of military might, demanding new concessions from the Soviet Union. It was this illusory threat of an ultimatum, rather than the real threat of German invasion, which increasingly worried Stalin during the few weeks and days before BARBAROSSA. He was not alone. A succession of foreign statesmen and journalists were also taken in by the planted rumors of a German ultimatum. 28

Beria sought to protect his position as head of the NKVD by expressing mounting indignation at those inside and outside the NKVD who dared to send reports of preparations for a German invasion. On June 21, 1941 he ordered four NKVD officers who persisted in sending such reports to be “ground into labor camp dust.” He wrote to Stalin on the same day with his characteristic mix of brutality and sycophancy:

I again insist on recalling and punishing our ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, who keeps bombarding me with “reports” on Hitler’s alleged preparations to attack the USSR. He has reported that this attack will start tomorrow… But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, have firmly embedded in our memory your wise conclusion: Hitler is not going to attack us in 1941. 29

Also in jeopardy for providing intelligence on the forthcoming German invasion was the senior INO officer Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin, later chief resident in the United States. 30Early in 1941 Zarubin was sent to China to meet Walter Stennes, German adviser to the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Stennes had once been deputy head of Hitler’s stormtroopers, the Sturmabteilung, but developed a grudge against him after being sacked in 1931. In 1939 Stennes was approached by the NKVD Chungking residency and agreed to supply intelligence on Hitler. In February 1941 Zarubin reported to the Centre that a visitor from Berlin had secretly assured Stennes that “an attack against the USSR by the Germans… was being planned for the end of May this year” (the original date set by Hitler but later postponed). 31Zarubin cabled on June 20: “The FRIEND [Stennes] repeats and confirms categorically—based on absolutely reliable information—that Hitler has completed preparations for war against the USSR.” 32Fitin outraged Beria by taking these and similar warnings seriously. An SVR official history concludes, probably correctly, “Only the outbreak of war saved P. M. Fitin from the firing squad.” 33

The devastating surprise achieved by the German invasion in the early hours of June 22 was made possible both by the nature of the Soviet intelligence system at the time and by the personal failings of the dictator who presided over it. In Whitehall the patient, if uninspired, examination of intelligence reports through the committee system eventually turned the belief that Germany saw the “overwhelming” advantages of a negotiated settlement with Russia into recognition that Hitler had decided to attack. In Moscow the whole system of intelligence assessment was dominated by the fearful sycophancy encapsulated in the formula “sniff out, suck up, survive,” and by a culture of conspiracy theory.

Stalin had institutionalized both a paranoid strain and a servile political correctness which continued to distort in greater or lesser degree all intelligence assessment even after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War in 1941. From 1942 to 1944 the Cambridge Five, probably the ablest group of Soviet wartime agents, were to be seriously suspected by the Centre of being double agents controlled by British intelligence simply because their voluminous and highly classified intelligence sometimes failed to conform to Stalin’s conspiracy theories. 34The responsibility, however, did not rest with Stalin alone. Some degree of distortion in intelligence assessment remained inherent in the autocratic nature of the Soviet system throughout the Cold War. The Centre always shrank from telling the Kremlin what it did not want to hear. The last head of KGB foreign intelligence, Leonid Shebarshin, confessed in 1992 that until Gorbachev introduced a measure of glasnost, the KGB “had to present its reports in a falsely positive light” which pandered to the predilections of the political leadership. 35

IN THE EARLY months of the Great Patriotic War, while the German forces advancing into Russia were sweeping all before them, Stalin faced the even more terrifying prospect of a two-front war. Ribbentrop instructed the German embassy in Japan, “Do everything to rouse the Japanese to begin war against Russia… Our goal remains to shake hands with the Japanese on the Trans-Siberian Railway before the beginning of winter.” Opinion in Tokyo was initially divided between those who favored the “northern solution” (war with the Soviet Union) and the supporters of the “southern solution” (war with Britain and the United States). Sorge, deeply distrusted by Stalin, sought to provide reassurance from Tokyo that the advocates of the “southern solution” were gaining the upper hand. But on October 18 Sorge was arrested and his spy ring rapidly rounded up.

SIGINT was more influential than Sorge in persuading Stalin that there would be no Japanese attack. Late in 1938 the combined NKVD/Fourth Department SIGINT unit had been broken up. The NKVD section moved into the former Hotel Select on Dzerzhinsky Street, where it concentrated on diplomatic traffic; most, but not all, military communications were the responsibility of the cryptanalysts of the GRU (successor to the Fourth Department). In February 1941 the NKVD cryptanalysts had been integrated into a new and enlarged Fifth (Cipher) Directorate, with, at its heart, a research section responsible for the attack on foreign codes and ciphers. The chief Japanese specialist in the section, Sergei Tolstoy, went on to become the most decorated Soviet cryptanalyst of the war, winning two Orders of Lenin. In the autumn of 1941, a group led by him replicated the success of American codebreakers a year earlier in breaking the main Japanese diplomatic cipher, codenamed by the Americans and since known to Western historians as PURPLE. The teetotal American codebreakers had celebrated their success by sending out for a case of Coca-Cola. Tolstoy is unlikely to have had time to celebrate at all. The Japanese diplomatic decrypts which he provided, however, were of enormous importance. Japan, they made clear, would not attack the Soviet Union. 36

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