Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

Two problems, however, remained in Church-state relations. The first was the Pope, who—according to Kiszczak—was cleverly exploiting the situation in Poland to advance his anti-Communist policies in eastern Europe. The second problem was the moral authority of the Polish Church. The people looked on the Church, not the Party, as the “standard-bearer of morality.” “In the immediate future,” Kiszczak admitted, “the Party will not be able to change the attitude towards the Catholic Church.”

Andropov seems to have hectored Kiszczak rather less than most other Polish leaders he had met over the previous few years. But he ended their meeting in somber mood:

The class enemy has repeatedly tried to challenge the people’s power in the Socialist countries… But the Polish crisis is the most long drawn out, and perhaps the most dangerous. The adversary’s creeping counter-revolution has long been preparing for the struggle with Socialism. 42

Solidarity’s first national congress (held in two sessions from September 5 to 10 and from September 26 to October 7) provided further evidence of “creeping counter-revolution.” Its appeal on September 8 “to the working people of eastern Europe… who have entered the difficult road to struggle for a free trade union movement” was denounced by the SB as “a brazen attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Socialist countries.” 43

Pavlov now seemed satisfied that Jaruzelski was prepared for “decisive measures” to end “the threat from Solidarity.” On September 29 he reported to the Centre that he had “advised” Jaruzelski on the line to follow at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on October 18. 44The first priority was to get rid of Kania, who, Pavlov reported, continued to pursue “a policy of conciliation” towards Solidarity. Having failed to secure Kania’s dismissal at the July Party congress, Moscow was determined to succeed at the October Central Committee plenum. The Centre must have been particularly outraged by Pavlov’s account of a secret briefing on Kania’s policy given by his supporter, Deputy Prime Minister Kazimierz Barcikowski, on October 2, 1981. According to Barcikowski, Kania was “disenchanted with the Soviet model of Socialism”:

The Soviet system of Socialism had failed the test. The fact that the USSR was systematically buying grain in the West was an indication of serious errors in the management of agriculture… The power of the Soviet regime was maintained only through the army and other agencies of coercion. However, in the last two or three years, the situation had begun to change to the Soviet Union’s disadvantage. China was significantly strengthening its military power; its military and economic contacts with the USA were a serious threat to the USSR, and pinned down a large number of troops on the far eastern borders. In the last few months, the situation in Afghanistan had sharply deteriorated. It was now clear that it would be impossible to win this conflict politically without the use of mass repressive measures similar to those used by the Americans in Vietnam. If at the present time the USSR still had some strategic advantage over the USA, within three or four years it would lose it, as the Soviet economy would no longer be able to meet the additional expense of developing and producing new types of armaments.

The imposition of the Soviet model of socialism had, Kania believed, “bureaucratized the PUWP” and distorted Leninist principles:

He regarded it as his main task to do everything to protect the positive processes taking place in Poland, including the Solidarity movement, in order to create a basis for genuine Socialism which, with certain variations, could also find a place in other Socialist countries. 45

Even Dubček during the Prague Spring had never made such a devastating indictment of the Soviet system.

Pavlov’s detailed reports on Kania indicate either that his home had been bugged or that there was an informer in his immediate family. He informed the Centre that on October 5, “Kania came home in a very agitated state and told a narrow circle of his family that the Russian comrades are again plotting to remove him from the post of First Secretary.” Kania claimed not to understand why his Soviet “friends” did not tell him frankly that he must resign. If they did so, he would go “without causing a fuss.” According to the KGB, Kania’s wife was deeply disturbed by his state of mind and anxious for him to resign so that he could recover his health and cease to be “a persecuted politician.” But Pavlov did not believe that Kania really intended to go quietly. He reported on October 7 that Kania had instructed Kiszczak to take action against a number of Party members who, he believed (no doubt correctly), were plotting against him. 46Kiszczak, however, sided with Jaruzelski and the plotters.

Kania’s fate was sealed at a stormy confrontation with Jaruzelski, Kiszczak, Milewski (now secretary of the PUWP central committee) and two other Polish generals. Jaruzelski told him that, unless he agreed to preparations for martial law, they would go ahead behind his back—and “decisive” (but unspecified) action would be taken against him personally. 47On the morning of October 18, just before the opening of the plenary meeting of the central committee, Aristov informed Kania that it was the “unanimous view” in Moscow that he should be replaced as first secretary by Jaruzelski. 48The central committee duly did Moscow’s bidding, and Kania gave way without a struggle. According to KGB reports, Kania said after his dismissal that he was still haunted by memories of the shooting of strikers in 1970. If he had remained first secretary, he would never have been able to give the order to open fire again. 49

Next day, October 19, Brezhnev telephoned Jaruzelski to congratulate him on his appointment as first secretary, while keeping his existing posts as prime minister and defense minister. “Hello, Wojciech,” Brezhnev began. “Hello, my dear, deeply esteemed Leonid Ilyich!” Jaruzelski replied. He maintained the same sycophantic tone throughout the conversation:

Thank you very much, dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all for the confidence you have in me. I want to tell you frankly that I had some inner misgivings about accepting this post and agreed to do so only because I knew that you support me and that you were in favor of this decision. If this had not been so, I would never have agreed to it.

Jaruzelski added that, later in the day, he would be meeting Aristov to discuss the situation in detail and would “be asking for your suggestions on some questions which he, no doubt, will convey to you.” Lying effortlessly, Brezhnev told Jaruzelski that the CPSU Politburo had realized long ago that he was the right man for the job. 50Predictably, he made no mention of the fact that in the course of the summer the KGB had recommended sacking Jaruzelski as well as Kania. In the end, however, the Politburo had reluctantly concluded that only Jaruzelski possessed the authority to declare martial law. 51

Soviet doubts about Jaruzelski, however, continued. On November 4 Jaruzelski began talks with Wałęsa and Archbishop Glemp at which he proposed their participation in a Front of National Accord which, while it would have no decision-making powers, would keep open dialogue between the state, Church and unions. 52Though Pavlov and Aristov were in favor of tactics designed to damp down any suspicion by Wałęsa and Glemp that martial law was imminent, they feared that Jaruzelski would end by making real concessions. On November 13 they sent a joint telegram to the Politburo condemning Jaruzelski’s indecisiveness and his attempt to conciliate Wałęsa, and urging that he be pressed yet again to declare martial law without further delay. 53On november 21 the Politburo approved the text of a personal message from Brezhnev to Jaruzelski, berating him for his inaction: