Bevin Alexander - How Hitler Could Have Won World War II

As the Germans swarmed through the gaps around Faid, they quickly isolated, encircled, and forced the surrender of the Americans on adjoining djebels, ending any chance to block the advance. Anderson ordered withdrawal to the Western Dorsals.

The panzers attacked the Americans in front of Sbeitla on the morning of February 17. The Americans fought stubbornly until nightfall, then fell back. In three days, the Americans had lost 150 tanks and nearly 3,000 men captured, while German losses had been minuscule.

Meanwhile the battle group under General Liebenstein occupied Gafsa, which the Americans had abandoned, and rushed on to capture Feriana, twenty miles southwest of Kasserine, on February 17, destroying a number of American armored personnel carriers (APCs) and guns, then seized the airfield at Thelepte, where the Americans destroyed thirty aircraft on the ground to prevent capture.

As the crisis unfolded, General Fredendall acted in panic, pulling American forces back to Tebessa and setting fire to some of the supply dumps there. British General Sir Harold Alexander, who took over command of the whole Tunisian front on February 19, reported that “in the confusion of the retreat American, French, and British troops had become inextricably mingled; there was no coordinated plan of defense, and definite uncertainty of command.”

Rommel now resolved to drive through Tebessa and then turn north. This would force the Allies to pull their army out of Tunisia, or face its destruction. But the strike had to be made at once. Otherwise the Allies could assemble large forces to block the way.

Furthermore, Rommel told Arnim, “the thrust northward had to be made far enough behind [that is, west of] the enemy front to ensure that they would not be able to rush their reserves to the [Western Dorsal] passes and hold up our advance.”

But General Arnim either could not see the possibilities of the strike or, as Rommel believed, “wanted to keep the 10th Panzer Division in his sector for a small private show of his own.”

Rommel appealed to the Italian Comando Supremo. The Italian supreme command agreed to an attack, but prohibited a thrust by way of Tebessa. Instead it had to go by way of Thala to Le Kef; that is, through Kasserine and Sbiba passes and northward just behind the Western Dorsals.

To Rommel this was “an appalling and unbelievable piece of shortsightedness,” for it meant the thrust was “far too close to the front and was bound to bring us up against the strong enemy reserves.”

But it was no time for argument. Rommel put his Africa Corps on the road at once for Kasserine pass, while 21st Panzer got orders to strike northward from Sbeitla to Sbiba, twenty-five miles east of Thala. Rommel ordered 10th Panzer Division to Sbeitla, where it could support the Africa Corps or 21st Panzer, whichever needed help. But Arnim delayed sending 10th Panzer, so none of it was on hand when the attacks opened.

The blow toward Thala came where Alexander was expecting it, and he ordered Anderson to concentrate his armor for the defense of the town. Anderson sent the British 6th Armored Division to Thala, and the 1st Guards Brigade to Sbiba.

At Kasserine, German motorized infantry, used to desert warfare, tried to rush the pass. They ignored the 5,000-foot mountains on either side, which the Americans held and from which forward observers called down heavy mortar and artillery fire on the Germans. This stopped the attack in its tracks.

Meanwhile 21st Panzer Division came to a halt in front of Sbiba, held up by water-soaked roads, a dense minefield, and the guards brigade. This division, too, made the mistake of attacking frontally in the valley instead of striking off across the hills.

Just as Rommel had predicted, the strike to Sbiba and toward Le Kef was so close to the Allied lines that reserves could get into blocking positions quickly. Some took positions in the hills that were difficult to assault, gaining time to bring up more reinforcements.

Rommel concluded the Allies were weaker at Kasserine, and he focused his attack there, ordering up 10th Panzer Division. When Rommel arrived on the morning of February 20, General Friedrich von Broich, 10th Panzer commander, told him he’d brought only half his force—General von Arnim had held back the rest, including the Tigers, which Rommel was counting on.

Panzer grenadiers and Italian mountain troops now made flanking attacks on both sides of the pass, while, for the first time in Africa, Rommel unleashed Nebelwerfer— rocket launchers—modeled after the Russian Katyusha launcher. Nebelwerfer could throw 80-pound rockets four miles. They shook the Americans badly, and by 5 P.M. that day the pass was in German hands. Rommel reported that the Americans fought extremely well, and that German losses were considerable.

During the night Rommel moved his armor toward Thala to the north and Tébessa to the northwest. His aim was to confuse the Allies as to the direction of his next thrust and to force them to divide their reserves. The Allies fell for the bait. Fredendall brought Combat Command B of 1st Armored Division to guard the road from Kasserine to Tébessa, while the British 26th Armored Brigade Group moved south from Thala and took up a position ten miles north of Kasserine pass.

On February 21, a battle group of 10th Panzer (30 tanks, 20 self-propelled guns, two panzer grenadier battalions) pressed north against 26th Brigade, repeatedly flanking its positions, and destroying 40 tanks while losing a dozen of its own. The British withdrew to Thala, but a string of German tanks, led by a captured Valentine, a British infantry tank, followed on the 26th’s tail, got into the position, overran some infantry, shot up many vehicles, and captured 700 prisoners.

Next day Rommel learned from aerial reconnaissance that Allied reinforcements were approaching, reducing chances of driving through Thala. Meanwhile, Africa Corps on the Tébessa road had been checked by heavy American artillery fire.

On the afternoon of February 22, Rommel and Kesselring, realizing their weakness, concluded nothing more could be accomplished and ordered withdrawal. Fredendall, not seeing what was happening, did not organize an effective counterstrike, and the Germans retreated with little loss through Kasserine pass.

Rommel’s whole operation killed or wounded 3,000 Americans and netted more than 4,000 prisoners and 200 destroyed Allied tanks, against fewer than a thousand Axis casualties and far lower tank losses. But, if Arnim had cooperated and the Comando Supremo had shown any vision, the Axis gains could have been immensely greater.

Meanwhile Arnim, using the armor he had withheld from Rommel, launched his operation in the north on February 26. They were largely direct attacks at eight points along a seventy-mile stretch. The main objective was Beja, sixty miles west of Tunis.

Rommel described the plan as “completely unrealistic.” The main attack became trapped in a narrow, marshy defile ten miles short of Beja, and British artillery knocked out all but six tanks. Although the attacks netted 2,500 British prisoners, the Germans lost 71 tanks, the British fewer than 20.

The attack also delayed a strike Rommel was planning against Montgomery’s 8th Army at Medenine, facing the Mareth line, giving Montgomery time to quadruple his strength and to stop Rommel’s attack when it came on March 6. After losing 40 tanks, Rommel called off the effort. This ended any chance of defeating Montgomery before his army linked up with the other Allied army in Tunisia.

Rommel, elevated February 23 to command all forces in Africa, but facing an enemy twice as strong in men and nine times as strong in armor, concluded it was “plain suicide” for the Axis to remain. He took his long-deferred sick leave to Europe on March 9, hoping to convince Mussolini and Hitler to evacuate while there was still time. Mussolini, Rommel wrote, “seemed to lack any sense of reality,” while Hitler, impervious to Rommel’s arguments, concluded he had “become a pessimist,” and barred his return to Africa.