Joachim Fest - Plotting Hitler's Death

Amid all the jubilant announcements of further German victory appeared a name from the past that had virtually been forgotten: General Werner von Fritsch, the former commander of the army, who had quietly been rehabilitated but never reinstated. In a final, quixotic appearance, he was killed during the last days of the Polish campaign while observing the attack on Warsaw from the suburb of Praga.

After little more than three weeks Poland had been taken. The opponents of the regime, whose disappointment with the Western powers had always been colored with contempt, felt confirmed in that feeling when Britain and France failed to intervene, giving Hitler a lightning victory. France, which was bound by treaty to launch be­tween thirty-five and thirty-eight divisions against Germany within sixteen days of the outbreak of hostilities, delayed mobilizing its forces. Throughout the half-hearted drôle de guerre, the French sought to cling as long as they could to the glorious illusions of the age and to the mirage of a peace that had long since been lost.

On the day the war began, Brauchitsch released a declaration stating that the hostilities were not directed against the Polish people and that the conquered territories would be administered in accordance with international law. But only one week later, Hitler issued guide­lines for governance indicating that he had no intention of leaving the administration of the Polish territories to the army. In keeping with his principle of divided authority, he created a civilian administration in addition to the military one and, as if to complete the confusion, sent in so-called Einsatzgruppen (or “task forces,” the SS’s notorious execution squads) behind the front-line troops. These Einsatzgruppen were technically subject to the military justice system but actually look their orders from Reich Security Headquarters and therefore from Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. They soon instituted a reign of terror. Even before the Polish campaign was concluded at the end of September, the first complaints had been lodged about summary executions of Poles and Jews, arbitrary harassment, and indiscriminate arrests.” And as early as September 9, Quartermaster (General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel went to see Halder at Canaris’s request to inform him of Reinhard Heydrich’s comment that every­thing was going “too slowly.” Heydrich had declared, “These people have to be shot or hanged immediately without any sort of trial… aristocrats, clergy, and Jews.” 16

Three days later, on a visit to the Führer’s train, Canaris himself informed General Keitel that he had learned that “widespread shoot­ings were planned” in Poland and that “the aristocracy and clergy in particular” were to be “wiped out.” Canaris pointed out that “in the end, the world will hold the Wehrmacht responsible as well.” Typi­cally, Keitel failed to address the substance of what Canaris said, confining himself solely to questions of jurisdiction and noting that “these things had already been decided by the Führer, who made it clear to the army high command [Brauchitsch] that if the Wehrmacht did not want to become involved in all this it would have to accept the presence of the SS and Gestapo,” which would, together with civilian authorities, undertake “the ‘ethnic exterminations.’” 17

And so the situation remained. Brauchitsch was very consistent in complaining only when the SS or civilian authorities overstepped their authority, although he involved himself in many petty quarrels on this account. He never raised the far more telling question of the extent to which the brutal systematic slaughter besmirched the honor and reputation not only of the Wehrmacht but of Germany itself. Even though he had given his word to the Polish people in his decla­ration of September 1, he remained impassive. And while he did work tirelessly to keep the Wehrmacht from involvement in any atrocities, by so doing he only cleared the way for acts of breathtaking barbarity by the other branches. Attempts were soon made within the Wehr­macht to enforce discipline and proper conduct more rigidly and to punish transgressions severely, but these efforts were inevitably frus­trated and could not later shield the organization from accusations of thinly veiled complicity in the slaughter.

For a time, Brauchitsch attempted to keep commanders in the conquered and occupied territories from realizing that the so-called land cleansing operations in the east stemmed from decisions made by Hitler himself to which Brauchitsch had acquiesced without com­plaint. As a result, it was widely believed that the atrocities were due to “excesses by lower-level authorities.” General Walter Petzel and, even more emphatically, General Georg von Küchler demanded an end to the indiscriminate massacres, as did others. Küchler described one SS unit as a “disgrace to the army.” When the senior band leader of SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler ordered fifty Jews shot, General Jo­achim Lemelsen had him arrested and turned over to the army group for sentencing. General Wilhelm Ulex, who had been rehabilitated and returned to command, also demanded an end to the so-called ethnic policy, which he called a “blot on the honor of the entire German people.” 18

There; was no doubt in Brauchitsch’s mind that any intervention along the lines demanded by these generals would lead to a fierce confrontation since the policies involved were in fulfillment of some of Hitler’s most basic aims in the East. 19The commander in chief was simply not prepared for such a showdown. In vain did General Wil­helm von Leeb remind the army leadership that the “army, if reso­lutely led, is still the most powerful factor around.” 20

Far from heeding this call to action, Brauchitsch sought salvation instead in evasion and did all he could to shed responsibility for the administration of the occupied territories. On October 5, in response to a complaint from Albert Forster, a gauleiter, or district leader, that the Wehrmacht was demonstrating a “lack of understanding” of the regime’s ethnic policies, Hitler fulfilled Brauchtisch’s request by re­moving Danzig and West Prussia from the jurisdiction of the military. Twelve days later, army responsibility for all other areas was with­drawn. At a meeting in the new Chancellery with Himmler, Keitel, Martin Bormann, Rudolf Hess, and Hans Frank, who had been designated the future governor general of occupied Poland, Hitler re­marked that the Wehrmacht should be happy to be rid of these tasks. Keitel made notes in pencil on the Führer’s further comments: Po­land was not to be turned into some kind of “model province”; the emergence of a new “class of leaders” must be prevented; his policy required “a tough ethnic struggle, which could tolerate no constraints”; and “any tendency toward a normalization of conditions must be stopped.” Hitler concluded with his infamous remark about the “devil’s work” to be done in the East. 21

The abrupt end of the army’s responsibility for administration resulted in a surge of arbitrary actions on the part of party, civilian, and police authorities, kangaroo courts, district commissars, auxiliary po­lice, and others, who could now claim to be carrying out special as­signments not subject to external oversight. The change in administrative responsibilities also heightened the conflict with the army units remaining in these areas. General Karl von Rundstedt left his post as commander in chief of the eastern districts in horror after a short period; his successor, General Johannes Blaskowitz, sent Hitler a memorandum in early November describing the abuses, crimes, and atrocities, expressing his “utmost concern,” and pointing out the danger that these actions posed to the morale and discipline of the troops. Hitler rejected the “childishness” of the army com­mand, saying, “You can’t wage war with Salvation Army methods.” 22