Philip Longworth - Russia

In May 2003 Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Belarus and Armenia, agreed to set up a collective security organization with headquarters in Moscow, a rapid-reaction force for Central Asia under Russian command, and a common air-defence system. They also agreed to co-ordinate foreign policy and security. 8The Collective Rapid Deployment Force was set up within a year, and, in return for rescheduling part of that country’s sizeable debt, 9Russia also obtained a permanent lease on a military air-base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, at the heart of the region and within range of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China.

Russo-Chinese relations since the collapse have prospered. Trade between the two countries almost tripled during Putin’s first term. Both powers are involved together with three Central Asian states in the ‘Shanghai Forum’, and their common interests include anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency (China approves of Moscow’s policy in Chechnya, Russia of Chinese policy in Taiwan and Tibet), international conflict management, and Iraq. China implicitly recognizes Russia’s leading role in Central Asia. Divergent interests may divide them in future, but for the moment the Russo-Chinese entente holds. 10Furthermore, as in the Soviet period, relations with India are good, and India remains a major importer of Russian arms and military technology. In Asia, then, Russia’s power and influence have been growing again.

The United States is the world’s only superpower, but even a superpower’s ability to control territory and peoples has its limitations, as the intervention in Iraq has demonstrated. Russia lacks the strength to challenge America in the foreseeable future, yet nothing is immutable. The world changes, and the strategic order will change with it. Russia has begun to recover. Its military capability is considerable albeit much reduced, and its tradition of careful diplomacy based on superior intelligence, realism and understanding of other cultures gives it advantages which others lack, and will stand it in good stead. History provides no sure guide of things to come, but, as I write in September 2004, it would be unwise to write off Russia’s chances of future power.