Michael Dobbs - One Minute to Midnight

“understand that there are limits”: Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 8.

“it would be foolish”: NK1, 494.

When Khrushchev’s son-in-law: Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 153.

“One thought kept”: NK1, 495.

“What if we were”: Dmitri Volkogonov, Sem’Vozdei (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), 420; the English version of Volkogonov’s book, Autopsy for an Empire (New York: Free Press, 1998), 236, provides a slightly different translation.

that “something big”: Author’s interviews with F-102 pilots Dan Barry and Darrell Gydesen, November 2005-February 2006.

The first five planes: USAF incident report, October 22, 1962, AFSC.

By mobilizing the reserves: Alekseev message to Moscow, October 23, 1962, CWIHP, 8-9 (Winter 1996-97), 283.

Even before Castro issued: Tomas Diez Acosta, October 1962: The Missile Crisis as Seen from Cuba (Tucson, AZ: Pathfinder, 2002), 156.

“The Americans”: Fernando Davalos, Testigo Nuclear (Havana: Editora Politica, 2004), 22.

“The goofiest idea since”: Dallek, 335.

“Patient too tired”: JFK medical file, JFKL.

“ready to quit”: Kraus files, JFKL.

“I’m sorry, doctor”: Reeves, 396.

It was a short twenty-minute hop: Author’s interview with Ruger Winchester, former B-47 pilot, February 2006.

Logan was totally unprepared: History of 509th Bombardment Wing, October 1962, and Special Historical Annex on Cuban Crisis, FOIA, Whiteman AFB.

The 509th would have had difficulty: Author’s interview with Ross Schmoll, former B-47 navigator, December 2005.

“We shouldn’t worry”: Carlos Franqui, Family Portrait with Fidel (New York: Random House, 1984), 192.

Soviet commanders had been gathering: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr’, 130.

Pliyev had accepted the Cuba post: M. A. Derkachev, Osoboe Poruchenie (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994), 24-28, 48-50; Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr’, 79. For Pliyev’s personality, see also Dmitri Yazov, Udary Sudby (Moscow: Paleya-Mishin, 1999), 183-5.

The general explained the situation: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr’, 143; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 306.

“Cuba si, yanqui no”: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 234.

Orders had already gone out: Karlov interview.

The submarines were still: Mikoyan notes dictated in January 1963; see Mikoyan, 252-4.

“in the interests of the motherland”: Vladimir Semichastny, Bespoikonoe Serdtse (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 236.

Radiation detection devices: U.S. Navy message, November 14, 1962, from DNI to CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

The photo interpreters had identified: October 22, 1962, transcript, JFK 3, 64. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 542.

An initial shipment of ninety: The NSA incorrectly identified the Indigirka on September 25 as an “icebreaker,” but correctly noted that she had left from the Murmansk area. See NSA Cuban missile crisis release, October 1998. For Aleksandrovsk shipment, see Malinovsky report for Special Ammunition for Operation Anadyr, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2. Details on the Indigirka shipment come from Karlov notes and interview. The Soviet officer in charge of the deployment, Col. Nikolai Beloborodov, said in 1994 that six nuclear mines were also sent to Cuba, but this claim has not been confirmed by documents—James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford: Routledge, 1998), 58.

nicknamed “Tatyanas”: The formal name for the bomb was RDS-4. Author’s interview with Valentin Anastasiev, May 2006.

The Tatyanas were an afterthought: CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 259. See also draft directive to commander of Soviet forces on Cuba, September 8, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.

The absence of security fences: Based on the details provided by Anastasiev, the storage site for the Tatyana bombs appears to have been 23deg1’13’’N, 82deg49’56’’W, on the coast about five miles west of Mariel.

Like the Indigirka: A January 1963 reconstruction by the CIA located the Aleksandrovsk at the Guba Okolnaya submarine facility near Severomorsk on October 5. See “On the Trail of the Aleksandrovsk, ” released under CIA historical program, September 18, 1995, CREST.

Three 37mm antiaircraft guns: Malinovsky report, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.

Demolition engineers had placed: See Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 208, for the story of the Indigirka crossing. Aleksandrovsk procedures were similar.

for “saving the ship”: Report by Maj. Gen. Osipov, MAVI; Karlov interview.

The Aleksandrovsk kept radio silence: For the escort ship, see, e.g., NSA intercepts, October 23, 1962; Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.

a “dry cargo” ship: See CIA memorandum on “Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba,” October 23, 1962, JFKARC. On October 24, after the Aleksandrovsk had already docked in La Isabela, the CIA gave an incorrect position for the ship, and said she was not expected in Havana until October 25—CIA memorandum, October 24, 1962, CREST. The Aleksandrovsk was located through electronic direction-finding techniques rather than visually.

“an underwater demolition attack”: Mongoose memo, October 16, 1962, JFKARC.

The raiders later boasted: CIA report on Alpha 66, November 9, 1962, JFKARC; see also FBI report, FOIA release R-759-1-41, posted on Internet by Cuban Information Archives, www.cuban-exile.com. The Alpha 66 raid took place on October 8.

The Aleksandrovsk and the Almetyevsk: Ship’s log inspected by Karlov, arrival recorded as 1345 Moscow time. The NSA located the Almetyevsk twenty-five miles from La Isabela at 3:49 a.m., NSA Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.

“The ship Aleksandrovsk… adjusted”: Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 254. The authors incorrectly report that the Aleksandrovsk arrived later in the day.

“So you’ve brought”: Author’s interview with Gen. Anatoly Gribkov, July 2004.

The port soon became: Author’s interview with Rafael Zakirov, May 2006; Zakirov article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, October 5, 2007. See also report by former nuclear weapons chief Beloborodov in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 204-13. Writing three decades after the crisis, Beloborodov is unreliable on dates and some other details, but his report is the most authoritative account available about the handling of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba.

The six RF-8 Crusader jets: U.S. Navy records, NPIC Photographic Interpretation Reports, CREST; raw intelligence film for Blue Moon missions 5001, 5003, and 5005, NARA; author’s interviews with Comm. William Ecker, Lt. Comm. James Kauflin, and Lt. Gerald Coffee in October 2005. Ecker flew mission 5003.

One thousand feet was the ideal: Author’s interview with John I. Hudson, who flew Crusaders over Cuba, October 2005. Other pilots remember taking photographs from lower altitudes, but Arthur Lundahl and Maxwell Taylor told JFK on October 24 that the previous day’s photographs were taken from “around 1,000 feet”—JFK3, 186-7. The raw film, now at NARA, has numerous markings stating that it was shot at 1,000 feet.

“Chalk up another chicken”: Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 374.

“You’re a pilot”: Ecker interview.

Fernando Davalos: Davalos, 15.