The two American citizens [Burger and Haupt] are guilty of high treason. This being wartime, it is my inclination to try them by court martial. I do not see how they can offer any adequate defense. Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible to be and it seems to me that the death penalty is almost obligatory. 16
In the case of the other six who I take it are German citizens, I understand that they came over in submarines wearing seamen’s clothes— in all probability German Naval clothes—and that some of them at least landed on our shores in these German Naval clothes. I think it can be proved that they formed a part of the German Military or Naval Service. They were apprehended in civilian clothes. This is an absolute parallel of the case of Major André in the Revolution and of Nathan Hale. Both of them were hanged. Here again it is my inclination that they be tried by court martial as were André and Hale. Without splitting hairs, I can see no difference.
Biddle did not need reminding that Nathan Hale had been a spy for George Washington captured by the British behind their lines on Long Island and hung the very next morning, on September 22, 1776. Major John André was a British officer caught by Washington’s army behind American lines in civilian clothes after returning from negotiations with Benedict Arnold for the surrender of West Point. He too was found guilty of espionage and executed by hanging, on October 2, 1780. Like Hale and André, the Nazi saboteurs had violated the customary rules of war and should be dealt with accordingly. That, at least, was how Roosevelt saw it.
“I want one thing clearly understood, Francis,” he told Biddle the next time they discussed what should be done with the saboteurs. “I won’t give them up… I won’t hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand?”
NOT EVERYONE in the government was happy with Hoover’s handling of the case, and particularly his decision to go public. The secretary of war, Henry Stimson, was “very, very angry” with the FBI for failing to consult with the military before announcing the arrests of the saboteurs. 17A patrician Republican lawyer recruited by Roosevelt to give a bipartisan character to the war effort, Stimson felt that an extraordinary chance had been lost to destroy Nazi sabotage networks once and for all.
Stimson’s chief of intelligence, Major General George Strong, was informed about Hoover’s press conference a few moments before it began, and given no opportunity to object. “The premature breaking of the story has wrecked our plans for seizing two additional groups of four men each who apparently are scheduled to land on our shores in August,” Strong complained the following day. 18“In consequence, the only benefit to National Defense that can be obtained is the deterrent effect upon possible sabotage by the prompt trial and execution of the eight men now in the hands of the FBI.”
At least Strong was informed in advance. Other officials received their information from the press. The head of naval intelligence in New York, whose men had dug up sabotage material on Amagansett Beach, was “incensed” by the “entire absence of any reference” to his department in the materials released by the FBI. Captain R. C. MacFall described the failure to keep him informed of developments as “rather shoddy” and “not conducive to full cooperative effort.” 19“Our operatives were made to appear stupid when they were informed by local police and radio broadcasts that the enemy agents had been picked up. In view of the fact that they had been sitting in company with FBI agents in fox holes on the beach during rain and fog, and were being bitten with sand fleas, they do not feel very happy being treated this way.”
The sniping went both ways. Hoover was furious with naval intelligence for allegedly “concealing” evidence from the FBI. He delighted in shooting down attempts by other government agencies to muscle their way into the investigation. He accused the Justice Department of making “amateurish suggestions” and blasted a senator who called on the FBI to employ “strong arm tactics” against the saboteurs as “a cheap politician trying to get some publicity.” 20When the Office of Strategic Services asked for access to the transcripts of the interrogations of Dasch and the other saboteurs, Hoover ruled that “none of this material is to be plowed over until we are definitely through with it.” By contrast, when other agencies refused the FBI access to their materials, he was always quick to complain.
Some of this bureaucratic bickering percolated up to an exasperated FDR. The chief of the president’s Secret Service detail, Mike Reilly, complained that “Hoover’s boys hogged all the credit for running down the culprits.” 21A branch of the U.S. Treasury, the Secret Service had played a peripheral role in the investigation, tracing the dollar bills that Dasch used to try to bribe the coastguardsman on Amagansett Beach to a shipment of currency sent to Germany in 1939. Reilly complained that the nation’s oldest federal law enforcement agency always received “fullest cooperation from Army and Navy Intelligence… but never the slightest recognition from FBI.”
IN THE meantime, Dasch was having second thoughts about his agreement to plead guilty. Escorted back to his cell from Donegan’s office on the afternoon of June 27, he had “ample time” to brood over his situation. At 10:25 that evening, he asked his FBI guard for another meeting with Donegan. The guard promptly relayed the message to Donegan, who said he would see the prisoner in the morning.
An obviously distraught Dasch then asked the guard for a cigarette and a cup of cold water. As he sipped the water, pacing up and down his tiny cell, he began talking incoherently to the guard. “I’ve been a coward, but tonight I found myself.” 22He said he had read a newspaper account of the sufferings of American soldiers on Corregidor, which had helped him find his courage. “I cannot cause an innocent man’s death. Young people should live. People who have already lived their lives can die. That’s the way my mother and father would want it.”
The guard had no idea what Dasch was talking about, and was under strict orders not to engage the prisoner in conversation. He just listened, waiting for him to hand back the empty cup.
Dasch had a sleepless night, tossing and turning on the hard planks that served as a bed. The following morning, he peeked through the peep-hole of his wooden cell door and saw another guard reading a newspaper story about Hoover’s press conference. His own picture was splashed across the front page under the headline “CAPTURED NAZI SPY.” 23He felt confused and betrayed. His brother and sister lived in the United States. What would they think when they saw the story? What would his friends think? What right did they have to use his picture anyway?
When Donegan finally dropped by to see him, Dasch said he had changed his mind. Instead of pleading guilty, he would take his chances in court, and provide a full explanation for his behavior. The meaning of his disconnected remarks of the previous evening now became clear. He was willing to risk Nazi retribution against his parents in Germany (“people who have already lived their lives”) for his own reputation and the well-being of his brother and sister in the United States (“Young people should live”).
FBI officials were furious. Donegan reported to Hoover that the prisoner was “behaving like an opera star.” 24Connelley said he was in favor of “shooting Dasch” because he “backs in and out,” “stands on his dignity,” “gets up and waves his arms,” and throws a fit “when there is no reason for it at all.” Even the patient, solicitous Traynor admitted to having “doubts” about Dasch’s veracity. He found it almost impossible to figure his star informant out. First Dasch had expressed great concern about the fate of his parents in Germany, insisting that the German government must never be permitted to learn of his role in betraying Operation Pastorius. Now he was saying his parents would have to look after themselves.
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