John Wohlstetter - Sleepwalking with the Bomb

Unknown to Kennedy and his advisers then was how many nuclear warheads and types of nuclear-capable delivery systems were on the island, or what command and control arrangements were in place between the Soviet and Cuban strategic forces. Dobbs writes (surely accurately) that Cuba’s nuclear arsenal “far exceeded the worst nightmares of anyone in Washington.” Specifically, deployed or en route to Cuba by ship were no less than 158 warheads. Ninety were already on the island, including 36 one-megaton warheads that could be hurled almost 1,300 miles and 36 14-kiloton warheads (Hiroshima-size) mounted on small tactical nuclear missiles. An estimated 150,000 American troops were to be sent to take the island, and 1,397 separate targets had been marked for destruction as part of the invasion. The Russians were prepared to send tactical bombers carrying Hiroshima-size A-bombs to annihilate any major invasion force.

Even without nuclear missile strikes on American soil, the instant carnage that would have been inflicted by the invasion force alone—by some 45,000 Soviets armed with atomic weapons, plus a much larger volunteer Cuban contingent—would have been the worst in American military history. The invasion force had the potential to suffer in a single day the death toll of Americans killed by enemy fire in the Korean and Vietnam wars combined.

En route on ships were 68 warheads, including two dozen for ballistic missiles, which could deliver one megaton 2,800 miles away (roughly the distance from Havana to Seattle). Khrushchev recalled these to Russia—weapon security on Cuba was dicey. The island heat made storage hotter than was safe for the warheads; accidental megaton-level ground detonation was a serious possibility. Without trigger locks, most nuclear weapons on Cuba could be released by the local commander—in some cases, a lieutenant—ignoring orders to the contrary from Moscow. Had an invasion come, as one Russian former soldier stationed in Cuba then put it, “You have to understand the psychology of the military person. If you are being attacked, why shouldn’t you reciprocate?” Ironically, the minimal level of perimeter and site security at the Bejucal nuclear storage bunker led CIA analysts to conclude that the facility did not house nuclear weapons.

Things were better, but far from secure, on the U.S. side. Pilots had unilateral release discretion for nuclear-armed air-to-air missiles, designed to vaporize strategic bomber squadrons. During the course of the 1950s and 1960s, several nuclear-armed strategic bombers crashed. One was carrying a pair of hydrogen bombs, each able to wipe out a major city. A crash cannot detonate a modern nuclear bomb, but such events are extremely dangerous nonetheless, in that any explosion can scatter highly radioactive nuclear material.

America’s fighter jets also could carry nuclear bombs. A nuclear-armed F-106 interceptor, armed with the MB-1 Genie air-to-air missile (a one-kiloton device that could be armed and fired at the pilot’s sole discretion), had a near mishap taking off. Designed to destroy all enemy planes within a quarter-mile radius, it was called by one pilot “the dumbest weapons system ever purchased.” F-102 interceptors had similar armament, and F-100 Super Sabres based in Europe carried hydrogen bombs to drop inside Russia. A young Navy pilot named John McCain sat in his A-4D Skyhawk jet on the aircraft carrier Enterprise , awaiting orders to drop A-bombs on selected Cuban targets.

Slow communications made matters worse. Both sides sent signals over broadcast television, sacrificing privacy for celerity. The Russian ambassador in Washington sent telegrams via Western Union, complete with pick-up via bicycle messenger. Informed by this potentially catastrophic infirmity, the superpowers established the Washington-Moscow Hot Line in 1963.

The Cuban Missile Crisis ended without millions perishing because at crucial moments Kennedy and Khrushchev chose caution. On October 24, three days before the crisis ended, Russian ships sailed away from the American “quarantine” line, avoiding what could have been a catastrophic confrontation at sea. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said upon hearing the news, “We were eyeball to eyeball and the other fellow just blinked.” In reality, Khrushchev had ordered the missile-carrying ships to turn back a day earlier, and only a few minor ships had proceeded to the quarantine line. But newspapers printed and broadcasters printed the legend.

THE DANGER in the twenty-first century Mideast with a nuclear-armed Iran would be vastly greater than that posed by Cuba and the USSR in 1962 for four reasons:

1. Greater vulnerability of geographically small states to nuclear strikes.

2. Inability to absorb a blow and retaliate due to short warning times.

3. A near-complete lack of rapid communication channels.

4. Leaders who have no experience in managing nuclear crises, and thus may either overestimate their chances of success with a surprise attack, or in extreme cases may succumb to an apocalyptic impulse to bring about the end of days.

Vulnerability.In the 1950s and early 1960s, the two superpowers faced each other with strategic forces that were primarily above ground and small in number. But missiles were not nearly accurate enough then to threaten them, and bombers alone could not ensure success. Furthermore, their vast size and widely dispersed populations made only a large-area attack capable of ending national life.

Today, missiles are frighteningly accurate, but the Gulf states cannot yet build such weapons. If one of them had a nuclear bomb, it would have to use military aircraft as a delivery system. (The advanced jets that the Gulf states purchase from the United States can carry nuclear bombs.) Such planes are vulnerable to a first strike. Given far fewer military installations and few cities with populations above 100,000 in the tiny kingdoms of the Gulf, countries could face devastation beyond recovery if caught in a surprise salvo of Hiroshima-sized bombs.

Short Warning Times.A Russian ICBM, launched from the Ural Mountains and hurtling through space at four miles per second, will travel the roughly 6,000 miles to America’s Atlantic coast in about 30 minutes. With flight distances between potential targets in the Mid-east often less than 1,000 miles, a high-speed jet can cover the distance in little more time than an ICBM can traverse oceans. Factor in missiles that fly at “merely” several times the speed of sound; in some cases, times from launch to impact within the Mideast would be less than 10 minutes. Iran has solid-fuel rockets, which use a gel fuel that (unlike liquid rocket fuel) is highly stable. Once loaded it can sit indefinitely and launch quickly.

Nor are jets the only Gulf state assets. In 1986 China sold 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to the Saudis. With a one metric-ton conventional warhead and 1,750-mile range they can easily reach Iran. But the Saudis may elect to purchase nuclear warheads for the CSS-2, or try to buy newer, more accurate models complete with nuclear warheads.

Communications Confusion.Between Washington and Moscow in 1962 there was only one functioning private communications channel, commercial telegraphy. Imagine a Mideast with a nuclear Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. With six nations there are 64 possible two-way interactions, with all the attendant prospects for misunderstandings during a crisis. Israel has used hot-line telephonic communications with adversaries, including the Palestinians, with mixed results. If with a single channel results are mixed, how will the result be with many diplomatic channels, and only hours—perhaps minutes—to Mideast Armageddon? Add in that these countries do not trust each other, making communication problematic at best. Assurance that a single unintended missile launch was in fact accidental may easily fail to convince a nervous target’s leaders.