Michael Neufeld - The Rocket and the Reich

Even when conditions in Mittelwerk were at their best, however, they were fundamentally barbaric. On June 22, 1944, the company felt compelled to issue a secret decree to managers: “On the part of the camp doctor… it has been repeatedly determined that detainees who work in the offices or on the shop floor have been beaten by company employees because of this or that offense, or even have been stabbed with sharp instruments.” The decree went on to remind employees that all infractions were to be reported to the SS, who would deal out the punishment. Attached was a copy of an earlier decree from camp commandant Förschner, forbidding any direct contact with prisoners except for work purposes, on pain of joining those unfortunates in a striped uniform. A handful of such imprisonments is known to have occurred, and a small number of employees risked everything to help the detainees, but the June 22 decree is evidence that Nazi ideology and the example of guards and Kapos had brutalized a significant minority of the German workforce. One can only speculate about the impact of such abuse on production quality, but it seems certain that terror ultimately does not beget competent workmanship, let alone willing cooperation. 64

It is unlikely that the decree had much effect. Further efforts to improve conditions at Mittelwerk were similarly feeble and were motivated solely by the desire to extract more and better work out of the prisoners. During the war crimes trial held in 1947, Georg Rickhey, a DEMAG executive and the new “General Director” of Mittelwerk as of May 1944, argued in his own defense that he had procured shoes and medical supplies for the prisoners. During his tenure the company also instituted a premium wage system; skilled prisoners could earn small amounts of money that could be spent at the camp canteen. One of the originators of that system may have been Rudolph. The two men were also allegedly among those who discussed a more fundamental change: a move from twelve-hour to eight-hour shifts for the prisoners. That idea went nowhere, because the camp administration rejected it. More slave laborers would have had to be procured, and it would have complicated coordination with the civilian workers, who also worked an eleven-hour day and a six-day week. In any case, the attitude of Sawatzki, Kammler, and the SS was callous indifference to, or sadistic enjoyment of, the sufferings of the detainees. There was very little chance that they would ever have approved a three-shift system, even if anyone had dared to push the measure energetically, which no one did. 65

Recently defenders of Rudolph, Dornberger, and von Braun have claimed that those three men did confront members of the SS with the need for better conditions if manufacturing quality was to improve, and, moreover, that they acted out of humanitarian concern. However, the three never once raised those claims immediately after the war, when they had to explain their records to the American authorities, nor did they ever mention them in their memoirs and public interviews. Their defenders’ assertions must be regarded with the greatest skepticism, especially as there is not a single document to back them up. At most, Rudolph, Dornberger, and von Braun argued that missile quality was not going to improve if the labor supply was not in better shape. 66

In addition, all three were present at a Mittelwerk meeting on May 6, 1944, in which the enslavement of more prisoners was discussed. The meeting had been called by Rickhey immediately after the Army and the Armaments Ministry had installed him as the nominal head of the firm. (The post of General Director had been created allegedly in order “to push back the influence of the SS” and to straighten out administrative confusion.) During the meeting, Sawatzki said that he would ask the SS to enslave 1,800 more skilled French workers in order to meet shortfalls in the Mittelwerk labor supply, a problem caused by the horrific toll of the winter. The meeting minutes indicate that, at a minimum, Dornberger, Rudolph, and von Braun said nothing. Objecting would have been risky, of course, and because von Braun had been conditionally released from a Gestapo jail just a month before, he was clearly in no position to object. Still, nothing in the past behavior of the other two indicates that they had any moral qualms about slave labor. 67

Von Braun’s post-arrest situation makes the evaluation of his responsibility more complex, but there is no doubt that he remained deeply involved with the concentration camps. On August 15, 1944, he wrote to Sawatzki regarding a special laboratory he wanted to set up in the tunnels to check out “ground vehicle test devices.” The letter begins:

During my last visit to the Mittelwerk, you proposed to me that we use the good technical education of detainees available to you and Buchenwald to tackle… additional development jobs. You mentioned in particular a detainee working until now in your mixing device quality control, who was a French physics professor and who is especially qualified for the technical direction of such a workshop.

I immediately looked into your proposal by going to Buchenwald, together with Dr. Simon, to seek out more qualified detainees. I have arranged their transfer to the Mittelwerk with Standartenführer [Colonel] Pister [Buchenwald camp commandant], as per your proposal.

Some A-4 electrical parts production had been moved into a factory adjacent to Buchenwald, which is why it was a source of skilled labor. Von Braun ended the letter by asking if Förschner could grant special privileges for the French professor, including the right to wear civilian clothes, “so that his enthusiasm for independent work can thereby be increased.” Humanitarian considerations may or may not have entered into that appeal, but it is clear that von Braun’s visit to Buchenwald and its commandant further implicated him in the system of slave labor. 68

In assessing the responsibility of the rocket engineers for the treatment of the prisoners and the impact of working conditions on production, one final issue must be considered: sabotage. On January 8, immediately after the first few missiles were produced, Mittelwerk directors Kettler and Förschner issued a warning. It alleged that “over and over again our installation has been consciously and maliciously damaged through intrusion, destruction and theft .” The document ordered the Technical Division (Sawatzki and Rudolph) and the Business Division (Bersch) to investigate measures for the prevention and detection of sabotage. Those two divisions were also responsible for reporting any incidents to the SD staff that Himmler had installed for the security of the ultrasecret works. The almost inevitable outcome of such reports was the hanging of the accused in camp in the most gruesome manner possible; the SS specialized in slow strangulation, which prolonged the agony for minutes.

Civilian workers and managers were denied all access to the prisoner section of the camp or the “sleeping tunnels” and were not forced to watch hangings inside the factory until March 1945, but they surely knew that executions were carried out in such cases, if not the manner of them. 69

In the case of Rudolph in particular, Sawatzki’s secretary testified after the war that sabotage reports did go through the production manager’s hands. Although no conclusive documentary evidence has survived to prove that charge, it is consistent with the January 8 order. Another rocket engineer who went to the United States also stated that one of Rudolph’s immediate subordinates passed such reports to the SD. (Prisoners have named other deputies of Rudolph as being among those who engaged in brutal beatings.) Such evidence makes it very difficult to believe Rudolph’s later assertion that he never saw such a report or heard of actual sabotage in the works, as opposed to accusations of sabotage based on poor workmanship. Survivors have testified numerous times that sabotage, whether carried out by isolated individuals or by resistance groups, was a fact in the Mittelwerk. The difficult question is to what extent such heroic actions contributed to quality control problems. The small Communist-led resistance organization at Dora reached its high point in the fall of 1944, at a time when such problems had been brought under control. It is therefore likely that sabotage played only a secondary, but not a completely insignificant, role in missile failures. 70