Richard Overy: The Battle of Britain

11 PRO AIR 22/262, ‘Daily Returns of Casualties to RAF Aircraft’, 25 June–29 September 1940.

12 AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’: p. 27; on self-sealing tanks, Appendix F. See too PRO AIR 16/715, HQ no. 24 Training Camp to HQ Fighter Command, 1 October 1940, ‘Notes of Conversations with Fighter Pilots’.

13 PRO AIR 22/296, Cabinet Statistical Branch, ‘Personnel: Casualties, Strength, Establishment of the RAF’; W. Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat, 1933 – 1945 (London, 1985), p. 54; C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939 – 1945 (4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501, Appendix 49 (xxviii).

14 PRO AIR 8/463, Air Intelligence, ‘Present and Future Strength of the German Air Force’, November 1940.

15 PRO PREM 7/2, Churchill to General Hastings Ismay, 26 June 1940; War Cabinet Polish Forces Committee, meeting of 1 July 1940; ‘Minute, Position of the Polish Air Force in England’, 30 June 1940. On efforts to find pilots, see AIR 6/70, Air Council minutes, 23 July, 6 August, 22 August 1940; AIR 19/162, Churchill to Sinclair, 12 August 1940.

16 PRO AIR 22/296, ‘Casualties, Strength, Establishment of the RAF’; AIR 16/659: for Churchill’s comment see Churchill minute, 24 June 1940; for Ismay, Fighter Command to Ismay, 27 June 1940. It took only three minutes to refuel a fighter, but ten minutes to rearm it.

17 AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’, pp. 11–12.

18 PRO CAB 120/309, ‘Notes of Meeting, 16 September 1940, on Inland Looking’; on the Observer Corps see D. Wood and D. Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930 – 1940 (London, 1961), pp. 153–8.

19 S. Cox, ‘A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940’, Intelligence and National Security, 5 (1990), pp. 432–4; F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 1 (London, 1979), pp. 177–82.

20 Details in AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’, p. 10. A ‘Purple’ warning was later added at night to warn services such as stations and docks to extinguish all work-essential lighting as an attacking force approached. Cooper’s remark in PRO INF 1/849, Policy Committee meeting, 1 July 1940. On anti-aircraft defences see B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp. 153–4.

21 PRO AIR 9/136, Air Ministry, draft memorandum, ‘Measures to be Taken in the Event of a German Invasion of England’, 29 October 1939, pp. 1–8.

22 PRO AIR 16/212, Fighter Command operational instructions, 8 July 1940, pp. 1–8; operational instructions, 18 September 1940, pp. 2–4.

23 PRO AIR 9/136, ‘Measures to be Taken…’, p. 2.

24 PRO WO 199/22, report for GHQ Home Forces, 31 July 1940, prepared by Major-General B. Taylor; Commander, London area, to GHQ Home Forces, 24 August 1940. ‘Despatch’, p. 18.

25 PRO PREM 3/88 (3), War Cabinet, COS memorandum, ‘Plans for Employment of Gas from the Air in Retaliation for its Use against Us by the Enemy’, 8 October 1940; AIR 9/136, Air Ministry memorandum, ‘Bomber and Fighter Efforts Available to Counter an Attempted Invasion’, 5 March 1941.

26 PRO AIR 9/447, Air Ministry, Plans Division: draft directive to Air Officer Commanding in Ireland, 24 June 1940; ‘Minute from Director of Plans’, 2 June 1940.

27 W. Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich (London, 1970), p. 544.

28 The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933 – 1945 (London, 1983, reprinted from AHB narrative, 1948), pp. 75–6.

29 Pre-war planning in National Archives, microcopy T177, roll 31, ‘Nachschubzahlen für Luftfahrtgerät’, 1 April 1938 (which estimated output of 1,753 per month on mobilization). Plans 15 and 16 in ΒΑ-MA, RL3 159, Lieferprogramm Nr 15,1 September 1939, and Flugzeug-Beschaffungs-Programm Nr 16, 28 October 1939. The 1940 plan in ΒΑ-MA, RL3162, Lieferplan Nr 18,1 July 1940.

30 British figure from PRO AIR 22/293, ‘Statistics: Aircraft Production, Imports and Exports, Schedule B’ (production from 1 June to 30 September).

31 D. Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Erhard Milch (London, 1973), p. 136.

32 PRO AIR 16/635, HQ 11 Group to HQ Fighter Command, 7 November 1940, ‘German Attacks on England 11 September–31 October 1940’, pp. 6–9.

33 Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 54–5; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 4, p. 501.

34 PRO AIR 22/72, Air Ministry weekly intelligence summary, 8 August 1940, p. 3.

35 PRO AIR 22/72, weekly summary, 15 August 1940, p. 4.

36 AHB, ‘Battle of Britain’ narrative, Appendix 37, ‘German Views on the Battle of Britain’, p. 1 (based on interviews with Field Marshal Erhard Milch and General Adolf Galland).

37 H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives 1939 – 1945 (London, 1966), pp. 74–9, Directive 16,16 July 1940; pp. 79–80, Directive 17, 1 August 1940. AHB, ‘The Course of the Air War against England’, translation of German AHB study, 7 July 1944, pp. 1–2.

38 PRO AIR 40/2444, O. Bechtle lecture, ‘German Air Force Operations against Great Britain, Tactics and Lessons Learned 1940–1941’, 2 February 1944, pp. 2–4.

39 E. Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels: Sämtliche Fragemente (4 vols, Munich, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 264, 270, 271.

40 Goebbels, Tagebücher, p. 277.

1 PRO AIR 40/2444, Bechtle lecture, pp. 7–8.

2 AHB, Dowding ‘Despatch’, p. 5.

3 PRO AIR 22/478, RAF Wireless Intelligence Service, daily summary, 13 August 1940. See too AIR 22/72, Air Ministry weekly intelligence summary, 15 August 1940, p. 1 – activity was ‘much higher than had been normal’.

4 PRO AIR 16/432, report on enemy activity over Great Britain, 27/28 June 1940.

5 C. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign 1940 – 1943 (London, 1995), pp. 111–22.

6 PRO AIR 9/447, Air Ministry, Director of Plans, memorandum, ‘Employment of the Air Striking Force’, 8 July 1940.

7 Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 4, pp. 118 – 24.

8 PRO AIR 22/296, ‘Casualties, Strength and Establishment of the RAF’. In mid-August the deficiency of bomber pilots reached a peak of 219; the highest deficiency of fighter pilots was 181 on 24 August.

9 PRO AIR 16/432, Home Security intelligence summary, 31 July/1 August.

10 PRO AIR 16/216, HQ 11 Group to all Group controllers, 19 August 1940.

11 AHB, ‘Course of the Air War…’, p. 2; FCNA, p. 128, OKW directive, 16 August 1940.

12 AHB, ‘Battle of Britain’ narrative, Appendix 8 III, ‘Table of Chief Attacks on Airfields and RDF Stations’, pp. 1–9.

13 AHB, ‘Battle of Britain’ narrative, Appendix 34 II, ‘Fighter Command Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged on the Ground’.

14 This paragraph and following account in PRO AIR 16/635, ‘Notes of Damage and Repairs at Certain Fighter Aerodromes’, 21 September 1940.

15 PRO AIR 16/216: HQ 11 Group to all Group controllers, 19 August 1940; telegram from 11 Group HQ to all airfields, 20 August 1940.

16 AHB, ‘Battle of Britain’ narrative, Appendix 8 III.

17 Jacobsen (ed.), Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 81, entry for 30 August 1940; Rise and Fall, p. 85.

18 PRO AIR 22/293, Schedule E, ‘Number of Aircraft in Storage Units’; PREM 3/29 (3), summarized order of battle, 6 September 1940; AIR 16/635, Fighter Command HQ, operational strength, 1 September 1940.

19 PRO AIR 22/262, ‘Daily Return of Casualties to RAF Aircraft’, 25 June–29 September 1940.