Платон - Platonis Apologia Socratis

The trial of Socr. was conducted before the ἡλιασταί: 9 9 "a juryman of the court, a Heliast" (Liddell and Scott, 1889). on their number see note on Apol. 36 A. 10 10 Wagner, p. 104: "Diogenes Laërtius 2, 41, agrees with our passage in stating that 281 judges pronounced Socr. guilty."

As for the defence of Socr., the reader is advised to study the Apology and the logical analysis of it which we subjoin: in general it may be said that the Apology, if not an exact reproduction of the speech made by Socr. at his trial, is doubtless an imitation of it so far as Plato's memory and own individuality (though this appears here entirely merged in the person of the historical Socr., while in Plato's other writings we generally have an ideal Socr.) enabled him to put down the arguments and expressions used by his master on that memorable occasion. This, at least, is the view taken by Grote, History of Greece, chap. lxviii., to which chapter on Socr. it seems desirable to direct the attention of the student after he has fully mastered the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo.

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ ( exordium ) 17–18 A: discarding all the usual rhetorical embellishments, Socr. is going to address the judges in simple, homely words, and say nothing but the truth; at the same time he begs a favorable attention to this unusual kind of speech.

ΠΡΟΘΕΣΙΣ ( propositio ) 18 B–19 A: Socr. has to refute a double kind of accusation, viz., besides the one brought against him by Meletus, the popular prejudices raised against him and kept up by the charges of his enemies.

ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ( confutatio ) 19 B–27 E in two parts, and first (–24 A) the misrepresentations mentioned in the second place are shown to be entirely without foundation, and the difference between Socr. and the Sophists is pointed out. The origin of these accusations is found in the annoyance created to many citizens by Socrates' habit of examining into their knowledge, and the zeal of his disciples who imitate this proceeding; but Socr. himself feels obliged to do so in consequence of an oracle of Apollo. To revenge themselves on Socr. these persons lay upon him the same blame as justly applies to the Sophists.

The second part (24 B–27 E) contains the actual refutation of the charge brought by Meletus, Anytus, and Lyco, and this charge being twofold, the defence also is subdivided into two parts.

( a ) Socr. shows that Meletus knows nothing of the art of education. If Socr. corrupts the youth it is necessary that he should do so either intentionally or unintentionally: the first he certainly does not, as only a madman could act so, it being the interest of all to live in a state composed of good citizens rather than of bad ones; if the latter be the case, Meletus ought to have spoken to Socr. privately and not have treated his ignorance as a crime.

( b ) As to the charge of introducing new divinities in the place of those worshipped by the city, Socr. shows that Meletus seems here to contradict himself, as the assumption of a daemonium implies also a belief in the existence of gods.

ΠΑΡΕΚΒΑΣΙΣ ( egressio or degressio ) 27 E–34 B. In spite of all these arguments Socr. feels nearly certain that he will be pronounced guilty, not so much on account of the charge now brought against him by Meletus, as in consequence of the general hatred against him. Yet he does not regret his previous doings, as his conscience assures him that he has been doing right, and accomplishing the mission entrusted to him by God. The fear of death shall not deter him from doing his duty, and if he were now released on the condition never to "teach" any more, he would refuse to accept life on these terms, as he knows he could not fulfil them. But should the Athenians sentence him to death, they will thereby deprive themselves of a monitor such as the gods will not again vouchsafe to their city. That Socr. was fulfilling a divine mission appears also from his poverty, which is caused by his postponing all domestic interests to his vocation of being a public monitor to the citizens. Socr. then adds a few words about his public life, and shows that there, too, he always intrepidly adhered to the principles of justice and honesty, even so as to brave the rage of a mob and the fury of the Thirty. Lastly, Socr. maintains that he is not responsible for the ill-deeds of some of those who used to be in his society and are called his pupils, as he himself never professed to teach them any thing. Nor (says he) has any one of the young men who were with him ever charged Socr. with corrupting him, nor have their parents or relatives done so; on the contrary many are now present at the trial, ready to help and support Socr. in any way they can.

ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ ( peroratio ) 34 C-35 E. Contrary to the common habit of moving the judges to compassion in order to obtain a lenient verdict, Socr. says that he will do nothing of the kind as this would be equal to inducing the judges to violate their oath.

The second part of the Apology requires no rhetorical disposition. Socr. confesses not to be surprised at the result of the trial: as to the τίμησις 11 11 "an assessment of damage", Aeschin., etc. "a rating" or "assessment", Arist. (Liddell and Scott, 1889). which he is now called upon to fix, he declares that he deserves the honor of dining in the prytaneum, if indeed he must justly estimate his own deserts. But he will yield to his friends so far as to offer to pay a fine which he is able to set down at 30 minae, his friends being ready to become securities for this sum, which would be above the means of Socr. himself.

The third part is first addressed to those of the judges who voted for death, and to them Socr. predicts that they will soon repent of their injustice. Then, turning to those who voted in favor of him, he joyfully proves to them that he neither expects death like a coward, nor looks upon it as an evil. A last request Socr. has to address to his judges, that, should his sons ever prefer riches to virtue and think themselves wise without being so, they may be corrected and put right in the same manner as Socr. himself used to act towards the Athenians.

Quomodo vos, Athenienses, affecerint accusatores mei, nescio: ego certe ipse quoque, illis dicentibus, paene mei sum oblitus; adeo persuasibilis eorum oratio erat. Quamquam veri quidem, prope dicam, nihil dixerunt. Sed ex plurimis rebus, quas mentiti sunt, maxime unam sum hanc miratus, quod monebant cavendum esse vobis, ne a me deciperemini, qui peritus essem dicendi. Quod enim eos non puduit, quia nunc statim a me refellentur reipsa, ubi patuerit me ne mediocriter quidem peritum esse dicendi, id mihi visum est ab iis impudentissime fieri: nisi forte dicendi peritum ipsi vocant eum, qui vera dicat. Si enim hoc volunt, fatebor equidem me, non ipsorum exemplo, esse oratorem. Isti igitur, ut ego aio, nihil veri dixerunt; vos autem ex me nihil nisi verum audietis. Non, hercle, Athenienses, pulchris contextam orationem, qualis ipsorum fuit, verbis et vocabulis, neque ornatam, sed audietis immediate dicta quotidianis vocabulis. Nam credo iusta esse quae dico: et ne quisquam vestrum exspectet aliter. Non enim deceat, opinor, cives, huic aetati, velut adolescentulo fingenti orationem, ad vos prodire. Et vero hoc etiam atque etiam, Athenienses, vos rogo et quaeso, si me eodem genere audiatis pro me dicentem, quo loqui sum solitus et in foro apud mensas, ubi me vestrum plerique audierunt, et aliis in locis, ut nec miremini, neque ob illud tumultuemini. Nam ita se res habet. Nunc ego primum in suggestum iudicii adscendi, annos natus plus septuaginta. Mirifice ergo hospes sum in dictione hic usitata. Ut igitur, si revera hospes essem, veniam mihi, opinor, daretis, si et voce illa et modo illo loquerer, in quibus nutritus essem: ita etiam nunc a vobis peto, id quod iustum est mea sententia, ut mihi dicendi modum liberum sinatis – fortasse enim aliquantulum deterior erit, fortasse melior – ; idque solum consideretis, atque ad id animum advertatis, utrum iusta dicam nec ne. Nam iudicis haec laus est; oratoris autem, vera dicere.