В Порус - Рациональность, Наука, Культура

292 Ibid., p. 26.

293 Ibid., p. 92

294 Smart J.J. Philosophy and scientific realism. L., 1963. P. 26

295 Ibid., p. 38

296 Sellars W. Science and reality. L. etc., N.Y. p. 140.

297 Ibid., p. 27

298 Sellars W. Essays in philosophy and history. Dordrecht etc., 1974, p. 239.

299 Transcendental arguments and science: essays in epistemology. Dordrecht etc., 1979.

300 Worall J. Scientific realism and scientific change // Phil. Quart. 1982. Vol. 32. N. 128, p. 216.

301 Leplin J. The historical objection to scientific realism // Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association. East Lansing, 1982. Vol. 1, p. 91.

302 Worrall J. Op. cit., p.221

303 Панов М. И., Тяпкин А. А., Шибанов А. С. Анри Пуанкаре и наука начала ХХ века // Пуанкаре А. О науке. М., 1983, с. 531

304 Putnam H. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge etc, 1975, vol. 1, p. 73.

305 Hardin J., Rosenberg A. In Defence of convergent Realism // Philosophy of Science, 1982, vol. 42, p. 604-615.

306 Laudan L. Realism without the Real // Philosophy of Science, 1984, vol. 51, N. 1, p. 161

307 См.: Laudan L. Progress and its Problem: towards a Theory of scientific Growth. Berkeley etc., 1977

308 Fraassen B. van. "To save the Phenomena" // Journal of Philosophy, 1976, vol. 73, ? 4, p. 623-632.

309 Fraassen B. van. Theory Construction and experiment View // Proceed. of the 1980 biennial Meeting of the PSA, 1981, vol. 2, p. 674.

310 Ibid., p. 675.

311 Worrall J. An unreal Image // Brit. Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1984, vol. 35, N. 1, p. 70.

312 Hesse M. The Hunt for scientific Reason // Proceed. of the 1980 biennial Meeting of the PSA, 1981, vol. 2, p. 7-8.

313 Putnam H. Meaning, and moral Sciences. L., etc., 1978, p. 123-140.

314 Glymour C. Theory and Evidence. Princeton (N.Y.), 1980, p. 127.

315 Friedman M. Explanation and scientific Understanding // Journal of Philosophy, 1975, vol. 71, N. 1, p. 5-19.

316 Hesse M. Op. cit., p. 13.

317 Ibid., p. 15.

318 Ibid., p. 16.

319 Musgrave A. Constructive Empiricism versus scientific Realism // Philos. Quart., 1982, vol. 32, N. 128, p. 271.

320 Dummet M. Realism // Synthese, 1982, Vol. 52, N. 1, p. 55.

321 Ibid., p.57.

322 Ibid., p. 61.

323 Ibid., p. 106.

324 Rasmussen S., Ravinkilde J. Realism and logic // Synthese, 1982, vol. 52, N. 3, p. 380.

325 Horwich P. Three Forms of Realism // Synthese, 1982, vol. 51, N. 2, p. 181-202; Merril G. Forms of Realism // Amer. Philos. Quart., 1980, vol. 17, N. 3, p. 229-235.

326 Putnam H. Why there isn't a ready-made world? // Synthese, 1982, vol. 51, N. 2, p. 163; Putnam H. Why reason can't be naturalised? // Ibid., vol. 51, N. 1, p. 4 -5.

327 Putnam H. Three Kinds of scientific Realism // Philos. Quart., 1982, vol. 32, N. 128, p. 198.

328 RescherN. Empirical inquiry. L., 1982, p. 268.

329 Worrall J. Scientific Realism and scientific Change // Philos. Quart., 1982, vol. 32, N. 128, p. 231.

330 PutnamH. Meaning and moral sciences, p. 10.

331 Putnam H. Philosophical Papers. Cambr., etc., 1975, vol. 2, p. 202.

332 См.: Порус В. Н. О философских аспектах проблемы "несоизмеримости" научных теорий // Вопросы философии, 1986, No 12, с. 57-70.

333 Putnam H. How not to talk about Meaning // Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 2. In Honor of Philipp Frank. N.Y., 1965, Note 3.

334 RosenbergJ. Coupling, retheoretizatlon and the correspondence principle // Synthese, 1980, vol. 45, N. 3, p. 351-385.

335 Stegmullerr W. Structures and dynamics of theories: some reflections on J.Sneed and Kuhn // Erkenntnis, 1975, vol. 9, N.1, p. 75-100.

336 Niiniluoto I.. The growth of theories: comments on the structuralist approach // Theory change, ancient axiomatic and Galileo's methodology. Dordrecht etc., 1981, p. 39-40

337 Sneed J. Structuralism and scientific Realism // Erkenntnis, 1983, vol. 19, N. 1-3, p. 366.

338 Fine A. And not anti-realism either // Nous, 1984, vol. 18, N. 1, p. 62.

339 Feibleman J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, Interpreted as a System, 2 ed. Cambr. (Mass.), L., 1970, p. 483.

340 Buchler J. Charles S. Peirce's Empiricism. N. Y., 1939.

341 Reichenbach I. Experience and Prediction. Chicago, 1938, p. 30, 79.

342 Моrris Сh. Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism. Paris, 1937, p. 12.

343 Nagel E. Charles S. Peirce - Pioneer of Modern Empiricism // Philosophy of Science, 1940. vol. 7, ? I, p. 69.

344 См.: Goudge T. The Conflict of Naturalism and Transcendentalism in Peirce // Journal of Philosophy, 1947, vol. 44, ? 2, pp. 365-375.

345 Nagel E. Op. cit., p. 76.

346 Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge (Mass.), 1952; Fairbanks M. Ch. S. Peirce and Logical Atomism // The New Scholasticism, 1964, vol. 38, ? 2, pp. 178-188; Bernstein К. In Defence of American Philosophy // Contemporary American Philosophy. N. Y., 1970, pp. 294-301; Delaney С. Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism // Monist, 1973, vol. 57, ? 2, pp. 240- 251; Thayer I. The Revolution in Empiricism: Peirce on Scientific Knowledge and Truth // Southeren Journal of Philosophy, 1979, vol. 18, ? 4, pp. 531- 545.

347 Fairbanks М. Ch. S. Peirce and Positivism // The Modern Schoolman, 1964, vol. 41, ? 4, p. 327.

348 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers. Cambr. (Mass.), 1965, vol. 5, p. 152, fr. 257.

349 Thompson M. Peirce's Verificationist Realism // Review of Metaphysics, 1970, vol. 32, ? I, p. 81.

350 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 6, p. 23S, fr. 349.

351 См: Transcendental Arguments and Science. Essays in Epistemology. Dordrecht etc., 1979.

352 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 5. p. 258. fr. 402.

353 Almeder R. Peirce on Meaning // Synthese, 1979, vol. 41, ? 1, p. 2.

354 Peirce Ch. S. Op. cit., vol. 5, p. 385, fr. 545. Конечно, здесь у Ч. Пирса большая неясность: являются ли эти законы объективными, или же под законом следует понимать "привычку" (habit), вызванную у субъекта действиями с данным объектом.

355 Almeder R. Ор. cit, р. 17-20. Сам У. Куайн, однако, замечал, что "принцип прагматизма" Пирса, если отвлечься от неясной формы его изложения, имплицитно содержит все положения, какие вошли в доктрину верификационизма (Quinе W. Word and Object. Cambr. (Mass.) etc., 1960).

356 Peirce Ch. S. I?. cit, vol. 5, p. 394, fr. 565.

357 Bertilsson M. Towards a Social Reconstruction of Science Theory. Pierce's Theory of Inquiry and Beyond. Lund, 1978; Freeman Е., Sсolimovskу Н. The Search for Objectivity in Peirce and Popper // The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, vol. 1. La Salle, 1974, pp. 464-519.

358 Almeder R. Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion // Studies in Epistemology, Oxford, 1975, p. 40.

359 Ibid., p. 54.

360 Rescher N. Methodological Pragmatism. A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Oxford, 1977.

361 Quinе W. Ор. cit., р. 23.

362 Hooker М. Peirce's Conception of Truth // Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions". Dordrecht etc., 1978, pp. 131-133.

363 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 5, p. 394, fr. 564.

364 Skagestade P. Pragmatic Realism: The Peircean Argument Reexamined // Review of Metaphysics, 1980, vol. 33, ? 3, p. 538.