Jeffrey Lewis - The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States

“They had no idea what it all meant”: William Schneider, a former US State Department official who reviewed classified after-action reports, as quoted in Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).

This conclusion reflected a broader consensus within the US intelligence community that Kim Jong Un was rational and could be deterred: This belief is discussed at length in a classified assessment—a 2017 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—described in Nancy A. Youssef, “Why the US Considers North Korea’s Kim a ‘Rational Actor,’” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2017.

“The phrase has never, ever been uttered by anyone in the White House”: An anonymous senior official, as quoted in David Nakamura and Greg Jaffe, “The White House’s ‘Bloody Nose’ Strategy on North Korea Sounds Trumpian. So Why Do His Aides Hate It?” Washington Post, February 26, 2018.

The US Air Force had established a “continuous bomber presence” mission at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam: The “continuous bomber presence” mission is described in Amy McCullough, “Bombers on Guam,” Air Force Magazine 98: 8, August 2015, 20–25.

This work fell to the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) at Lackland Air Force Base near San Antonio: JIOWC’s activities are highly classified, but one area of responsibility is developing approaches to messaging about US capabilities to strengthen deterrence. See [author redacted], “Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues,” RL31787, Congressional Research Service, March 17, 2009.

Pentagon officials highlighteda series of three flights involving B-1 and B-52 bombers in March 2013: Thom Shanker and Choe Sang-hun, “US Runs Practice Sortie in South Korea,” New York Times, March 28, 2013.

Again, in 2016, the Obama administration publicized three more flights: Yoo Han-bin, “US Bombers Fly over South Korea for Second Time since North’s Nuclear Test,” Reuters, September 20, 2016.

with twelve publicly announced flights taking place in 2017: The estimate of twelve publicly announced bomber flights in 2017 is based on Department of Defense press releases.

Starting in 2017, operations were in some cases conducted at night and much farther north: “Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers from Guam, along with Air Force F-15C Eagle fighter escorts from Okinawa, Japan, flew in international airspace over waters east of North Korea today, chief Pentagon spokesperson Dana W. White said in a statement announcing the mission. This is the farthest north of the Demilitarized Zone any US fighter or bomber aircraft have flown off North Korea’s coast in the 21st century, White said. The mission underscores the seriousness with which the United States takes North Korea’s ‘reckless behavior,’ she added.” US Department of Defense, “US Bombers, Fighter Escorts Fly over Waters East of North Korea,” press release, September 23, 2017.

a brand-new system, which the North Koreans called the Pongae-5 surface-to-air missile: Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, “North Korea’s Pongae-5 Anti-Air Missile: What Do We Know?” NK News, June 2, 2017.

North Korean state media openly referenced the “defects” that had slowed its development: “Kim Jong Un Watches Test of New-Type Anti-Aircraft Guided Weapon System,” KCNA, May 28, 2017.

“We received an order that an American bomber was violating our airspace”: Roh’s remarks are based loosely on comments by Gennadi Osipovich, the Soviet pilot who in 1983 shot down KAL 007, a civilian airliner that strayed into Soviet airspace—an event widely attributed to the tension that arose from the Reagan-era PSYOPS program. “I saw two rows of windows and knew that this was a Boeing,” Osipovich told the New York Times ’s Michael Gordon. “I knew this was a civilian plane. But for me this meant nothing. It is easy to turn a civilian type of plane into one for military use.” He also told Gordon that even “those who did not take part in this operation received double their monthly pay. At that time, monthly pay was 230 rubles. So I expected to be paid at least 400 rubles.” Michael R. Gordon, “Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL 007 Was Spying,” New York Times, December 9, 1996.

“It is retrogression of sorts that the President’s office exists as a small Cheong Wa Dae within Cheong Wa Dae”: Choi Sung-jin, “Blue House’s Building Layout Ineffective in Emergency,” Korea Times, November 7, 2015.

the Cheong Wa Dae complex retained two very important government functions: “No Blue House for South Korea’s New President,” Associated Press, May 10, 2017.

Many of her political opponents… had demanded to know what became of the “seven missing hours”: Kim Bo-eun, “President’s ‘7 Missing Hours’ Still Shrouded in Mystery,” Korea Times, November 26, 2016.

while another reported that she was having plastic surgery: James Pearson and Yun Hwan Chae, “South Korea Lawmakers to Quiz Doctors, Nurses about Park’s ‘Missing’ Seven Hours,” Reuters, December 13, 2016.

They turned the documents over to investigators and filed a complaint: “Former President Park’s Four Aides Indicted for Doctoring Time Log of Sewol Sinking Report,” Yonhap, March 28, 2018.

“Neither South-North relations nor US-North relations will go far if the other fails”: Kang In-sun, “Interview with Suh Hoon” (in Korean), Chosun Ilbo, March 10, 2018, translated by Grace Liu.

“Dialogue is impossible in a situation like this”: “Moon Says Dialogue with N. Korea ‘Impossible,’” Yonhap News Agency, September 15, 2017.

North Korea’s relentless “strategic and tactical provocations”: “JCS Chief Nominee Vows to Build Military ‘Feared by Enemies, Trusted by Citizens,’” Yonhap, August 18, 2017.

“President Moon seems to have meant that we ought to be doing everything we can to prevent a crisis situation”: Park Byong-su, “New Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Claims South Korea Can Achieve Air Superiority within Three Days of Conflict,” Hankyoreh, August 19, 2017.

Lee wanted a big and bold response, but military officials pushed him to consult with the United States: “Ex-President Lee Ordered All-Out Retaliation after North’s Yeonpyeong Bombardment in 2010,” Yonhap, December 13, 2015.

“South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive”: Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), 497.

satellite images later showed that its retaliation had done little or no damage: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Yonp’yong-do Incident, November 23, 2010, Special Report 11-1, January 11, 2011.

“Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation”… had been publicly described in some detail after 2016 : “South Korea Announces ‘Massive Punishment and Retaliation’ in Response to Fifth Nuke Test,” Hankyoreh , September 13, 2016.

“wiping a certain section of Pyongyang completely off the map”: “S. Korea Unveils Plan to Raze Pyongyang in Case of Signs of Nuclear Attack,” Yonhap, September 11, 2016.

Pyongyang… would“be reduced to ashes”: “S. Korea Unveils Plan to Raze Pyongyang.”

striking ninety-seven targets over four days, including three presidential palaces and the headquarters of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Desert Fox: A Preliminary Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 16, 1999).