Mikhail Gorbachev - The New Russia

prevent attempts by Gorbachev to leave the territory of the Russian Federation prior to open and legal consideration of the charges brought against him by Prosecutor Viktor Ilyukhin and the public, and also until final completion of investigations into the State Emergency Committee. Actions undertaken by any individual, state or public organization to facilitate the flight abroad of the former general secretary of the CPSU, former president of the USSR, former commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, will be considered hostile and criminal acts against the peoples of Russia and other republics of the USSR.

The Communists were joined by lawyers acting for those accused in connection with the State Emergency Committee case, who demanded interrogation of Gorbachev and a ban on his travelling abroad. This was followed by the first threats from the new Russian government. Deputy Prosecutor General Yevgeny Lisov, in an interview for the New York Newsday , announced that he considered Gorbachev ‘a suspect’ in a case investigating financing by the CPSU of foreign Communist parties.

Later, at hearings into the financial affairs of the CPSU, Lisov admitted that there was no direct evidence of Gorbachev’s involvement in the case, but claimed he bore ‘collective responsibility’ because at Politburo meetings where such matters were discussed he ‘never voted against’. Altogether, attempts were made from all directions to create a negative aura around me.

I reacted to it as any man with a clear conscience and strong nerves should. I had no intention of ‘fleeing’ anywhere and these people could not intimidate me. What did disturb me was that Raisa and my family and friends were being greatly upset by what was going on.

I was often asked during this period for my assessment of what was happening in Russia and what the response should be. This was a matter of interest to our Western partners also. When I met Rodric Braithwaite, the British Ambassador, in January, I said the reforms in Russia and other CIS countries were being carried through under difficult conditions and with considerable costs, but were in need not so much of commentary as of material support. I reminded him of the agreements reached during my participation in the London summit of the G7 leading industrial nations in July 1991, and again called for maximum support for Russia’s radical economic reforms, because if they failed that would affect all democratic forces. As regards the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the most important thing was to help it become a commonwealth not only in word but also in deed.

The Gorbachev Foundation was hard at work even before its official launch. We attracted authoritative research specialists to analyse the situation in Russia, and my colleagues associated with Perestroika joined in. At the end of January we met up to try to evaluate what was happening, to probe what was driving events and suggest steps to mitigate negative tendencies. Some of those assessments were to prove only too accurate. It is a pity they were ignored.

The experts were particularly exercised over whether integration of the republics of the ‘disbanded’ Soviet Union was still possible. The historian Grigoriy Vodolazov put forward the idea of organizing the CIS as a ‘multi-structural community’. ‘Currently,’ he said, ‘the prevailing intention is to set up the CIS with a standard pattern of association of the republics, but I would recommend providing for less intimate relationships within its framework, alongside closer links where possible.’

I was naturally concerned about these longer-term problems, but also about the course being taken by the economic reforms, which amounted to no more than price liberalization, indiscriminate privatization, opening the market to imports and hoping for foreign aid. My attitude was becoming increasingly critical, and in an interview for the Italian weekly Panorama and Russia’s Literaturnaya Gazeta [ Literary Gazette ], I reminded their readers that in my last conversation with Yeltsin in December 1991 I had said I was not planning to develop an opposition movement, but that did not mean I would abstain from criticism of weaknesses and mistakes. Of these there had already been plenty within the past month. I did not pull my punches:

I believe that before price controls were lifted there should have been measures to stimulate production and adjust tax and credit policies. The growing social unrest is worrying. If it reaches the point where people take to the streets, the stark question will be how to stay in control and carry on governing. That is why action is needed immediately, before it comes to that. I again urge the need for consensus. We cannot allow representatives of different political tendencies to carry on staging pitched battles.

I still consider the worst strategic mistake to have been terminating the Soviet Union as a unified country, with the accompanying destruction of culture, the economy and national defence, and the disruption of human relationships.

In an interview for Komsomolskaya Pravda , I explicitly warned that, if no adjustments were made to fiscal policy, no measures taken to stimulate production, and no effective institutions established capable of controlling the economic and political situation in the CIS, we might find ourselves facing a major political crisis.

For most of January I worked on my book December 1991: My Position . [2] M. S. Gorbachev, Dekabr’-91. Moia pozitsiia , M.: Novosti, 1992. It is a documentary account of my efforts to save the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the August coup. The publishers wrote in their annotation: ‘M. S. Gorbachev introduces the reader to the climate of December 1991, a month of immense importance for the future of the country and personally for the president of the USSR. His comments and reflections link excerpts from discussions, interviews, notes of telephone conversations, statements and other documents.’

I found work on the book hard-going, primarily in emotional terms. Everything was still raw in my memory, but I had a tremendous urge to tell the truth about that period and to think through everything soberly. In my introduction I wrote:

Over the last few weeks I have read a lot of articles about these events, some balanced, others accusatory; some well argued, others unsubstantiated; some dispassionate, others irate. Much of what has been written is true, but much more is far-fetched or outright fabrication.

I want to present my position during the course of the December events, because it remains unknown to many citizens. My arguments did not suit everybody and so, contrary to the principles of Glasnost, my speeches were either not reported at all or were ‘edited’ out of all recognition.

These events have roots both in our distant history and in the years of Perestroika, but already there is no mistaking the fact that one of their main causes was a loss of social cohesion, which became increasingly damaging after the August coup. Even now you will hear it claimed that the coup plotters were acting to prevent disintegration of the USSR and maintain the integrity of the state. Some even try represent the coup as an attempt to ensure the democratic reforms succeeded. That is codswallop. The real aims of the plot were obviously to retain and resuscitate the old ways, even if that meant resorting to the most extreme measures. Through their actions, the coup plotters disrupted the signing of the Union Treaty, implementation of the programme to counter the crisis, and reform of the Communist Party.