Joby Warrick - The Triple Agent

9. The Taliban leader was officially blamed: Although Mehsud denied involvement in the Benazir Bhutto assassination, communications intercepts pointed to his foreknowledge of the attempt on her life. See Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination,” Washington Post , Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/​wp-dyn/content/​article/2008/01/17/​AR200801​1703252​.html.

10. Before sunrise on June 23: Details of the June 23, 2009, operations described in author interviews with two intelligence officers briefed on the events. For more on the attacks, see Bill Roggio, “Scores of Taliban Killed in Second US Strike in South Waziristan,” Long War Journal , June 23, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/​archives/2009​/06/seventeen​_taliban_ki.php.

11. “It created a havoc”: Unsigned report by Dawn news staff, “Missile Attacks Kill 50 in South Waziristan,” Dawn , June 24, 2009, http://news.​dawn.com​/wps/wcm​/connect/​dawn-content​-library/​dawn/news/​pakistan/04-​suspected-us-​drone-strikes​-swaziristan-qs-03.

Chapter 7: The Jihadist

1. Humam al-Balawi arrived alone: Accounts of Balawi’s early weeks in Pakistan were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials briefed on the events.

2. “You have made us proud”: bin Zeid’s words, as recalled by Balawi in Dec. 26, 2009, video interview, op. cit.

3. I want to study medicine: Defne Bayrak’s account of her husband’s explanation for his travels to Pakistan, as told to al-Jazeera in Feb. 5, 2010, interview, op. cit.

4. from his Taliban interviewer: Interview excerpts, as published in “An Interview with the Shaheed,” posted by al-Sahab Web site on Feb. 28, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

5. The two had a mutual acquaintance: Descriptions of Balawi’s relations with Mehsud and his early interactions with the Pakistan Taliban provided interviews with a Tehrik-i-Taliban member and two Pakistani intelligence officers who later investigated the Balawi affair after the Khost bombing. Additional insights are drawn from Balawi’s accounts of his meetings with the Taliban chief.

6. Qari had beheaded a kidnapped Polish geologist: For a description of the incident, see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Feud over Murder of Polish Hostage,” Long War Journal , Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.longwar​journal.org/​archives/​2009/02/​taliban​_feud_over​_mu.php.

7. I could go to FATA: Description of Balawi’s offer of his spying services in Pakistan provided in author interviews with two Jordanian and four U.S. intelligence officials. A detailed account of Balawi’s meetings and conversations with bin Zeid about the assignment is related in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.

8. the “father of smoke”: For more on the terrorist Imad Mughniyeh and the circumstances of his death, see Matthew Levitt and David Schenker, “Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy online, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.washington​institute.​org/template​C05.php​?CID=2716.

9. who had killed Abdullah Azzam: For more on the influential cleric and the circumstances of his death, see Aryn Baker, “Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?” Time (June 18, 2009), http://www.time.com/​time/specials/​packages/​article/0,​28804,​1902809_​1902810​_1905173,​00.html.

10. the logistics of Balawi’s journey came together: Details about the arrangements for Balawi’s insertion into Pakistan were described by two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials personally knowledgeable or privy to classified briefings on the events.

11. he could make out a familiar form: Balawi describes his encounter with the guard Ahmad, a disabled Taliban fighter, while sleeping outdoors in a videotape essay titled, “O Hesitant One: It Is an Obligation!” posted by al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab, April 30, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

12. “We pray to God”: For a fuller description of the interview with Baitullah Mehsud, see Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama: Militant Leader Claims He Is Fighting a ‘Defensive’ Jihad to Destroy the White House,” Brian Ross Reports, Jan. 28, 2008, ABC News online, http://​abcnews.​go.com/​Blotter/​story?id=​4199754&page=1.

13. capturing an entire garrison: For a discussion of Baitullah Mehsud’s defiance of Pakistan’s government, see “Baitullah Mehsud,” a Times People Topic, New York Times , Aug. 25, 2009, http://topics​.nytimes.​com/top/​reference​/times​topics/people/m​/baitullah​_mehsud/​index.html.

14. the real target would be a decoy: This controversial story was described in detail by an official of the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban alliance, and related separately by two other Taliban associates, suggesting that it is a widely shared story that was used to establish Balawi’s credibility. There is no independent corroboration of the event by the CIA or other U.S. sources.

15. “Every drone strike”: Quote related in interview with Taliban official close to Mehsud.

16. his every move was being recorded: Detailed description of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud provided in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials involved in the planning or oversight of the operation.

Chapter 8: Pressure

1. Taliban leader was “alive, safe and sound”: “Taliban Ask Gov’t to Prove Mehsud Death Rumors,” AFP/Reuters, in Nation online, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/11-Aug-2009/Taliban-ask-govt-to-prove-Mehsud-death.

2. his staff was caught up in the drafting of a proposal: Details of the CIA’s proposal for strengthening its campaign against al-Qaeda, and of the White House’s reaction to the plan, were provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and one administration official involved either in the planning meetings or in the presentation.

3. helicopter gunships swept the Taliban’s valley: For a discussion of the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan from its faltering start in June 2009 to its final phase in October, see Bill Roggio, “What Lies Ahead in Waziristan,” Long War Journal , Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_what_lies_a.php.

4. touched off several bloody rounds of: Wall Street Journal online, Aug. 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/​article/​SB124976257​139816985.html.

5. Shadow Army, a paramilitary force: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’ ” Long War Journal , Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.longwar​journal.org/​archives​/2009/02/​al_qaedas_​paramilita.php.

6. technology had helped turn the tide against Iraq’s insurgents: Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” Washington Post , Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost​.com/​wp-dyn/​content/article/2008​/09/07/​AR20080​90701847.html.

7. “We don’t know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is”: Defense Secretary Robert Gates interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’ This Week , Dec. 5, 2009, http://blogs​.abcnews​.com/george/​2009/12/​where-is-​bin-laden-​secretary-gates​-says-no-​intel-in​-years.html.

8. One of the most promising involved: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.