Horst Goltz - My Adventures as a German Secret Service Agent

Long before this war began German agents were at work in Mexico stirring up trouble in the hope of causing the United States to intervene. I have already told how, in 1910 and 1911, Germany had encouraged Japan and Mexico in negotiating a treaty that was to give Japan an important foothold in Mexico. I have told how, after this treaty was well on the way to completion, Germany saw to it that knowledge of the projected terms was brought to the attention of the United States thereby indirectly causing Diaz's abdication (see Chapter V.). That instance is not an isolated case of German meddling in Mexican affairs. Rather is it symptomatic of the traditional policy of Wilhelmstrasse in regard to America.

It may be well to examine this policy more closely than I have done. Long ago Germany saw in South America a fertile field for exploitation, not only in a commercial way, in which it presented excellent opportunities to German manufacturers, but also as a possible opportunity for expansion which had been denied her elsewhere. All of the German colonies were in torrid climates, in which life for the white man was attended with tremendous hardships, and exploitation and colonisation were consequently impeded. Only in the Far East and in South America could she find territories either unprotected through their own weakness, or so thinly settled that they offered at once a temptation and an opportunity to the nation with imperialistic ambitions. In tire former quarters she was blocked by a concert of the Powers, many of them actuated by similar aims, but all working at such cross-purposes that aggression by any one of them was impossible. In Chapter II. I alluded to the result of such a situation in my discussion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. In South America there was only one formidable obstacle to German expansion the Monroe Doctrine.

I am stating the case with far less than its real complexity. There were, it is true, many facts in the form of conflicting rivalries of the Powers as well as internal conditions in South America, that would have had a deterrent effect upon the German programme. Nevertheless, it is certain that the prime factor in keeping Germany out of South America was the traditional policy of the United States; and, so far as the German Government's attitude in the matter is concerned, it is the only phase of the problem worth considering.

Germany had no intention of securing territory by a war of conquest. Her method was far * simpler and much less assailable. She promptly instituted a peaceful invasion of various parts of the continent; first, in the persons of merchants who captured trade but did not settle permanently in the country; second, by means of a vast army of immigrants, who, unlike those who a generation before had come to the United States, settled, but retained their German citizenship. With this unnaturalised element she hoped to form a nucleus in many of the important South American countries which, wielding a tremendous commercial power and possessing a political influence that was considerable, although indirect, would aid her in determining the course of South American politics, so that by a form of peaceful expansion she could eventually achieve her aims.

Was this a dream? At any rate, it received the support of many of the ablest statesmen of Gemany, who duly set about the task of discrediting the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of the very people it was designed to protect, so that the United States, if it ever came forcibly to defend the Doctrine, would find itself opposed not only by Germany, but by South America as well.

Now, the easiest way to cast suspicion upon a policy is to discredit the sponsor of it. In the case of the United States and South America this was not at all difficult; for the Southern nations already possessed a well-defined fear and a dislike of their northern neighbour which were not by any means confined to the more ignorant portions of the population. Fear of American aggression has been somewhat of a bugaboo in many quarters. Recognising this, Germany, which has always adopted the policy of aggravating ready-made troubles for her own ends, steadily fomented that fear by means of a quiet but well-conducted propaganda, and also by seeking to force the United States into taking action that would justify that fear.

As a means towards securing this latter end, Mexico presented itself as a heaven-sent opportunity. Even in the days when it was, to outward eyes, a well-ordered community, there had been men in the United States who had expressed themselves in favour of an expansion southwards which would result in the ultimate absorption of Mexico; and although such talk had never attracted much attention in the quarter from which it emanated, there were those who saw to it that proposals of this sort received an effective publicity south of the Isthmus. Given, then, a Mexico in which discontent had become so acute that it was being regarded with alarm by American and foreign investors, the possibility of intervention became more immediate and the opportunity of the trouble-maker increased proportionately.

Germany's first step in this direction was the encouragement of a Japanese-Mexican alliance, the failure of which was a vital part of her programme. It was a risky undertaking, for if, by any chance, the alliance were successfully concluded, the United States might well hesitate to attack the combined forces of the two countries; and Mexico, fortified by Japan, would present a bulwark against the real or fancied danger of American expansion, that, for a time at least, would effectually allay the fears of South America. That risk Germany took and, in so far as she had planned to prevent the alliance, scored a success. That she failed in her principal aim was due to the anti-imperialist tendencies of the United States and the statesmanship of Señor Limantour rather than to any other cause.

Then came the Madero Administration with its mystical programme of reform and an opposition headed by almost all of the able men in the Republic, both Mexican and foreign. Bitterly fought by the ring of Cientificos, who saw the easy spoils of the past slipping from their hands; distrusted by many honest men, who sincerely believed that Mexico was better ruled by an able despot than by an upright visionary; hampered by the aloofness of foreign business and Governments, waiting for a success which they alone could ensure, before they should approve and support; and constantly beset with uneasiness by the incomprehensible attitude of the Taft Administration and of its Ambassador the fate of the Madero Government was easily foreseen.

Before Madero had been in power for three months this opposition had taken form as a campaign of obstruction in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies supported by the Press, controlled almost exclusively by the Cientificos and by foreign capitalists; by the clergy, who had reason to suspect the Government of anti-clerical tendencies; and by isolated groups of opportunity-seekers who saw in the Administration an obstacle to their own political and economic aims. The Madero family were represented as incompetent and selfseeking; and in a short time the populace, which a month before had hailed the new Government as a saviour of the country, had been persuaded that its programme of economic reform had been merely a political pretence, and accordingly added its strength to the party of the Opposition.

Here was tinder in plenty for a conflagration of sorts. Germany applied the torch at its most inflammable spot.

That inflammable spot happened to be a man Pazcual Orozco. Orozco had been one of Madero's original supporters, and in the days of the Madero revolution had rendered valuable services to his chief. An ex-muleteer, uncouth and without education, he possessed considerable ability; but his vanity and reputation were far in excess of his attainments. Unquestionably he had expected that Madero's success would mean a brilliant future for himself, although it is difficult to tell in just what direction his ambitions pointed. Madero had placed him in command of the most important division of the Federal army, but this presumably did not content him. At any rate, early in February, 1912, he made a demand upon the Government for two hundred and fifty thousand pesos, threatening that he would withdraw from the services of the Government unless this "honorarium"--honesty would call it a bribe--were paid to him. Madero refused his demand, but with mistaken leniency retained Orozco in office and on February 27, Orozco repaid this trust by turning traitor at Chihuahua, and involving in his defection six thousand of Mexico's best troops as well as a quantity of supplies.