Dennis Showalter - Armor and Blood

23 Too late in the dayStahlberg, Bounden Duty , pp. 309–310.

24 An increasing number of similar onesDennis E. Showalter, “Conscience, Honor, and Expediency: The German Army’s Resistance to Hitler,” in Confront!: Resistance in Nazi Germany , ed. John J. Michalczyk (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 62–79.

25 To define his own place in historyMelvin’s excellent biography may be complemented by Benoît Lemay, Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s Master Strategist (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2010), and Marcel Stein, Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head—A Portrait , ed. Gwyneth Fairbank, trans. Marcel Stein (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2007).

26 Vatutin’s headquarters had been doing the same thingGlantz and House, Battle of Kursk , p. 208; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 426, 460–461.

27 Vatutin requested reinforcementsZamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 456–457.

28 Stated purpose of the meetingIbid., pp. 457, 470–471.

29 Lack of specialized recovery vehiclesIbid., pp. 447–449. Gary A. Dickson, “Tank Repair and the Red Army in World War II,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25 (2012): 381–392, is an overview of Red Army maintenance methods.

30 Quiet in the SS sectorNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 366–371.

31 “I couldn’t deal with it”Agte, Jochen Peiper , pp. 176–179.

32 On Totenkopf’s frontZamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 460–466; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 378–382.

33 Taken at all costsNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , p. 382.

34 Soviet attacks beganZamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 469–473; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 372–374.

35 Fourth Panzer Army’s daily report“KTB 4. Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-313, roll 369.

36 Suggested an opportunityAt least to Manstein. Manstein, Verlorene Siege , p. 501.

37 Dazed and mechanicalMellenthin, Panzer Battles , p. 226; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk , p. 210; cf. “Darstellung der Ereignisse XLVIII Panzer-Korps am 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170; and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 384–388.

38 Nowhere near in any of its divisional sectorsLodieu, III. Pz. Korps , pp. 121–126; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 474–480.

39 A revised planManstein, Verlorene Siege , pp. 500–501; Melvin, Manstein , p. 376; Frieser et al., Ostfront , pp. 141–144.

40 Strained to its limitsNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , p. 382.

41 It was Grossdeutschland’s turnIbid., pp. 412–413; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland , pp. 131–132; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles , pp. 228–229; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle , pp. 99–100.

42 First Tank Army … had done its jobArmstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders , p. 63.

43 “The stubborn defense of its current lines”Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 513–514.

44 Rhetoric of attack was challengedIbid., pp. 486–487.

45 Breith was on his ownIbid., pp. 495–496; Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps , pp. 126–140; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 409–411.

46 “Behaving splendidly”Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth , p. 489.

47 Vatutin respondedIbid., pp. 503–504.

48 Withdrawal to a new defensive lineIbid., pp. 504–512.

49 Das Reich’s panzer grenadiersNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 398–405; Lodier, III. Pz. Korps , p. 139.

50 Further refined and reconceptualizedCf. the summaries in Frieser et al., Ostfront , p. 145, and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 413, 417–418, with “Vorschlag für Operation Roland am 16.7.1943, KTB Panzerarmeeoberkommando 4 an Heeresgruppe Süd,” National Archives, T-313, roll 382.

51 Stavka’s planned offensiveDavid M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1991), pp. 229–252.

52 Unlikely to encourage a narrow focusNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , p. 445, revising his earlier judgment in Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943 (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996), pp. 55–56, 67.

53 Limited prospects for Manstein’s projected revision of CitadelNipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth , pp. 421–422.

54 Citadel’s file of might-have-beensWeidinger, Division Das Reich , pp. 213, 216.

55 Stalin and Stavka were anxiousZhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections , p. 194.

56 Southern Front attacked the Sixth ArmyMajor Dr. Martin Francke, “Sixth Army Defends the Mius River Line,” in Kursk: The German View , pp. 306–324.

57 Finally recognized the obviousFrieser et al., Ostfront , pp. 191–193; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk , pp. 244–246.

58 Out of touch with realityNewton, Hitler’s Commander , pp. 256–262; Frieser et al., Ostfront , pp. 185–190; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle , pp. 90–95; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising , pp. 262–267.

59 To change the Führer’s mindGlantz and House, Battle of Kursk , p. 238.

60 Position in the Mediterranean was steadily erodingCitino, The Wehrmacht Retreats , pp. 238–254, reconstructs and contextualizes admirably the quandary facing the German high command at this period. For a staff officer’s on-the-ground perspective of the situation in Italy, see Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1952), pp. 214–226.

61 Grew increasingly tenuousFor details and background, see Josef Schröder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943: Die deutschen Gegenmassnahmen im italienischen Raum: Fall “Alarich” und “Achse” (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1969).

62 He summoned KlugeFrieser et al., Ostfront , pp. 219–220.

63 No pressure was applied for close pursuitZamulin, Demolishing the Myth , pp. 458–459, 515.

64 Germany’s ultimate assetsManstein, Verlorene Siege , pp. 516–517.

65 Fighting Manstein’s warFor the German perspective, cf. Frieser et al., Ostfront , pp. 193–200, and Melvin, Manstein , pp. 382–387. The Russian side is predictably well and exhaustively presented in Glantz, Don to the Dnepr , pp. 251–365.

66 “A blizzard of red arrows”Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats , p. 232.

67 Zeitzler paid an unannounced visitManstein, Verlorene Siege , pp. 518–519.

68 Hitler flew to VinnitsaIbid., pp. 522–529; Melvin, Manstein , pp. 387–388, 391–394.

69 Demanded a private meeting with the FührerManstein, Verlorene Siege , pp. 529–530.