Gary Staff - Battle of the Baltic Islands 1917

Captain Knüpfer went on request a work crew of 300 men to complete concreting of the magazines. Captain Muromtsev continued: ‘I ask him to explain: firstly whether it is established the bomb was incendiary or ordinary; and secondly whether the fire detonated the charges or the shells.

‘The bomb was not incendiary, but ordinary, with few suffocating gases, and fell outside the door of the magazine. The fire burned for almost 30 minutes and I almost had time to reach the battery before the explosion. It was possible to extinguish the fire so that it could hardly be seen, and I think that an intermediate wall has burnt through, a shell was heated, which then resulted in the first explosion. Instantly after this there was a very big explosion which meant that the other 43 shells detonated, and this is quite possible according to the experiences of the scientific technical laboratory in Petrograd.’

The loss of the experienced officers could not be made good and replacements had not been found by the time the Germans attacked. The morale of the crew was also badly affected.

A further bombing raid on Zerel during the night of 8/9 October caused little additional damage, but three bombs badly damaged the steamer General Zimmerman , which was lying off Mento.

On 8 October German aerial reconnaissance reported two steamers lying off Zerel, which were thought to be minelayers. The first, of approximately 800 gross register tonnage (GRT) , lay off Zerel, whilst the other, of around 1500 GRT, lay off Mento. The I Torpedo Flugzeug Staffel at Windau were ordered to attack with their five torpedo-carrying aircraft. Each torpedo plane would be escorted by a single-seat fighter seaplane, whilst other seaplanes would fly at high altitude overhead to attempt to distract the anticipated heavy anti-aircraft fire. The targets lay about 1,000 metres from shore, in a water depth of 5 metres, but with a firing range of 1,500 to 2,000 metres the aircraft would be launching their torpedoes in a depth of approximately 10 to 11 metres, according to the charts; Torpedo Trial Kommand stated that although a greater depth was desirable, torpedoes could be launched normally in this depth of water. At this critical phase of preparations for Operation Albion, the destruction of two minelayers had great military importance, and Kapitänleutnant Mans, commander of the Windau Airstation, did not hesitate to order the attack, even though it would expend half the staffel ’s available supply of ten aerial torpedoes.

Towards 1330hrs the five Gotha WD 11 torpedo-bombers lumbered into the air, led by Leutnant zur See Stinsky in aircraft 1378. Following close behind were aircraft 1372, 1374, 1376 and 1377. Although visibility was good, there was a strong wind and swell, and the weather threatened to turn bad. The port squad, comprising aircraft 1372 and 1374, took course NNW towards the lighthouse at Zerel, initially at an altitude of 600 feet but later reducing to 300 feet. The smaller steamer lay on a north-northwest heading and therefore the staffel took up an attack course of northeast, further reducing altitude to avoid anti-aircraft gun fire from the battery near Zerel. About 1427hrs Leutnant zur See Tornau, in aircraft 1372, launched his torpedo at a range of 1,700 metres. It broke surface twice and then appeared to run normally. Shortly after, Leutnant der Reserve (Marine Artillerie) Esser launched his torpedo but the track of this torpedo could not be seen. The aircraft flying high above the scene observed one torpedo pass behind the stern of the steamer, whilst the track of the other was not sighted.

Meanwhile, Leutnant zur See Stinsky led the other aircraft in the attack on the larger steamer off Mento. This vessel lay on an east-southeast heading. The torpedo-bombers reduced their altitude to just 30 to 60 feet, flying en echelon to starboard, and began their attack run. At about 1430hrs the lead aircraft launched her torpedo at a range of 1,700 metres. The torpedo went straight to the bottom. Next Leutnant zur See der Reserve Schurer in aircraft 1377 launched his torpedo. After breaking surface several times it ran normally, but after traveling just 800 metres it suddenly veered off to port. At around 1432hrs Leutnant zur See der Reserve Rowehl, flying the last aircraft, dropped his torpedo. According to observation aircraft this missile passed 10 metres behind the stern of the steamer and later detonated on the bottom. After launching their torpedoes and whilst flying away the staffel were subjected to a violent anti-aircraft fire by guns ranging from 15cm artillery to machine guns, but without success. By 1530hrs all aircraft had safely landed in Windau.

The attack had failed completely, due mainly to the erratic performance of the torpedoes, which was thought to be due to the unfavourable water depth. Half the available aerial torpedoes had been expended without result. This poor outcome caused Vizeadmiral Schmidt, Chief of the Special Unit, to order that the I Torpedo Staffel be used primarily for bombing attacks and to conduct torpedo attacks only on especially rewarding targets and under favourable conditions.

After the failure of the torpedo-bombers it was decided to dispatch a hydroglider, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Peytsch, to attack one of the steamers. The hydroglider was a small light craft, weighing just a few tonnes with a crew of three, and powered by 2 or 3 aero engines driving aero propellers. It was armed with a single torpedo. On 24 August Peytsch had sunk the transport Penelope with a torpedo in almost the same position. On 10 October at 1500hrs, the hydroglider put to sea from Windau and took course northeast along the coast, intending to conduct the attack in the evening twilight. The boat steered to Michaelsturm and from there took course through the mined area toward the roadstead off Mento. About 1718hrs the battery at Michaelsturm observed the boat traveling on a northeast course, but just a few moments later, at 1727hrs, the battery at Gross Irben observed a heavy detonation and bright flash, where just previously the hydroglider had been. The boat did not return and was probably destroyed by either a shallow positioned mine or an internal explosion.

The German airships were also active during the preparations for operation Albion. In addition to reconnaissance missions they also conducted bombing raids. During the night of 24/25 September at about 0245hrs, LZ120 (commanded by Kapitänleutnant von Lossnitzer) dropped 3,700kg of bombs on the Zerel battery and was followed up by LZ113 (Kapitänleunant Zaeschmar) with 2,000kg of bombs. The bombs were reported to have been dropped accurately. On the evening of 1 October, L30 (Oberleutnant zur See Vermehren) , L37 (Kapitänleutnant Paul Gartner) and LZ120 attacked Salis, Salismunde and the surrounding areas, dropping a total of 8,000kg of bombs. This area was poorly defended and L30 bombed from just 4,000 feet. The results of the attack remain unknown.

The German operational plans for Albion called for a surprise landing by pioneer troops inside Tagga Bay on the northwest coast of Ösel, and simultaneously near Pamerort, a little further to the east. A breakthrough in the Irben Straits, to mount a landing somewhere inside the Riga Gulf, was not considered because the mine defences and battery No 43 at Zerel were simply too strong. Nevertheless, minesweeping work would be undertaken in the Straits in preparation for the later phases of the operation. Tagga Bay was not so well protected by mine barriers, although the approach route would have to be swept. It offered a secure, protected shelter, inside which troops could be landed and which could be sealed off with net barriers to protect the transport fleet from submarines. The first wave ashore, the pioneers, would be landed by torpedoboats and small steamers, which would provide supporting gunfire. After the beaches were secure, more troops and heavier equipment would be landed from the larger ships and transports.