A special supplement will report on the efforts of the supply organization. Signal Battalion 7 constructed a telephone wire net of 151km. The most important command positions were reachable by various means. Disruptions through enemy actions were extraordinarily frequent. For example, the central telephone in Panjokowa had 33, [in] Byki 63, [in] Karatajeka 72, [and in] Barbarikin-Cholm 98 disruptions to eliminate. Engineer Battalion 7 secured the position through the installation of 2,000 mines and through the construction of numerous obstacles and obstructions.
As this document makes clear, the German blitzkrieg had already sputtered to a stop in the Yel’nya bend by late August 1941; the Germans were clearly on the defensive and, in a campaign that was entirely constructed around the exploitation of speed and mobility, this was a real problem. The Red Army’s seemingly endless supply of men and machines also emerges from this report; it is noteworthy that only Soviet tanks make an appearance, while German armour is entirely absent. Of course, Red Army numerical superiority was not enough to tilt the battle in its favour, as German tactical superiority was reflected in the casualty totals of the two armies. Finally, the report emphasized the division’s fortitude. Despite being hammered continually by the Red Army, the 7th Infantry Division maintained both the necessary combat strength and morale to continue the offensive. This resilience in combat was indeed one of the strengths of the German army during the war on the eastern front and it would be tested time and again during the course of the conflict.
German fortunes in the campaign underwent a marked reversal at the end of the year. Despite major victories during the dual encirclement battles of Briansk and Via’zma in November 1941, the power of the Panzer Groups, as well as their accompanying infantry armies, had been ground down in their struggle against the Red Army and the elements.[19] The tenuousness of German success first made itself apparent on the southern section of the front, as the following entries from the 14th Panzer Division’s war diary make clear.[20] In the course of a single day, the division both celebrated its greatest achievement of the campaign, and prepared to defend the seizure of Rostov against a suddenly superior and resurgent Soviet force.
21.11.41: Therefore the 5-day fight to seize Rostov is essentially concluded. The important industrial and trading city is in German hands; the door to the Caucasus has been pushed open. The last effective rail connection for the Russians to the vitally important Caucasian oil is broken.
The achievements of the leaders and troops in combat and in enduring extraordinary hardships are exemplary and deserve to be especially emphasized. The severe strains of the last weeks of combat have been forgotten in these days. Everyone approached the last great task with an exemplary attack spirit, in order to achieve a decisive goal for the entire conduct of war. At the beginning of the attack, the Panzer Regiment had perhaps company strength [while] the combat strength of the rifle companies was generally not higher than that of a platoon. The missing of all winter clothing whatsoever made itself even more noticeable with the severe cold.
Nevertheless, a breakthrough of the deeply positioned, excellently constructed enemy positions south of the Tusloff [River] was achieved in the first onslaught, the decisive defensive victory against heavy counterattacks led with the support of the heaviest panzers on Bolschije Saly, and finally the taking of Rostov city and bridge after bitter urban combat.
However, the division learned for the first time that enemy attacks against XIVth [Motorized] Corps have become so strong, that a considerable pulling back of the front has taken place. In the area given up, there are numerous divisional vehicles, especially panzers, which during the breaking of the rain and the subsequent frost period could not be carried along due to damage. Since the division was unaware of the strong threats to the flanks, it is not possible to send more towing services than before in the area of Agrafenowka. The division must therefore consider further vehicles, which due to minor damage in the area of XIVth [Motorized] Corps, as complete write-offs.
For the division, there will unfortunately still not be the hoped for quiet that the troops so deserved after the difficult fighting on the offensive. Heavy enemy forces are on the northern flank of the deeply advanced IIIrd Panzer Corps and threaten the already won Rostov. Therefore new heavy fighting is imminent.
Within eight days, the situation had degenerated into one that the division viewed as critical:
29.11.41: This day was the most difficult for the division in the entire war against Russia. The situation is extremely critical because
1) the troops are completely exhausted, as they have been given no break since the beginning of the offensive against Rostov on 17.11. The men have been continually in the tremendous cold, almost exclusively in the open, partially without winter clothes and warm food,
2) the vehicle situation no longer allows for any large-scale movements for eventual counter-thrusts,
3) the individual battalions are so weakened through losses, that no reserves can be formed,
4) the high losses in weapons and equipment have considerably weakened the combat power,
5) the enemy continually introduces new forces and attacks in mass.
The 14th Panzer Division’s complaints regarding the effects of weather on the troops and the scarcity of operational vehicles were echoed by other mechanized units. Far to the north in the Volkhov River area, the 10th Panzer Regiment – the primary armoured component of 8th Panzer Division – submitted a report detailing the unit’s deficiencies.[21]
To the 8th Panzer Division Ia.,
On 7.12.41, I submitted a report about the possibility or impracticality of refreshing the regiment for wide-ranging movements under the prevailing weather conditions in the east. After taking a look at the yet again concentrated battalions of the regiment, I once more report that a refreshing and restoration of the regiment’s combat readiness, which is necessary for wide-ranging movements, is not possible due to shelter and weather conditions in this region. The regiment’s equipment, especially the tanks, suffers so severely due to the cold that new equipment and equipment that has been recently repaired in the Heimat breaks down very quickly with great damage. It is a known fact that all metal-pieces lose their elasticity due to the strong effects of the cold and often break like glass, without being caused by intense stress. A temporary storage and shutting down of the equipment is not possible, as training and supply runs must be carried out. The bringing-up of the spare parts from Minsk would by itself strain to an intolerable extent all vehicles dedicated to this task. The experiences of the previous winter in Neuhammer and the refreshing in Bohemia have revealed that the number of trips far and away surpass the previously set number. I don’t believe that the workshop is in the condition to do any of the essential things for the new revitalization, outside of the continual repairs that continually crop up due to the effects of the cold and snow. Even with its extensive experiences, it has already practically reached its capacity for vehicles that require repair. As already pointed out in the report from 7.12.41, combat strength is in the first place based upon a well-trained officer corps and properly trained crews. Due to the heavy casualties of the eastern campaign, which have amounted to 14 company commanders alone, such gaps have occurred that filling them with replacements trained in the Heimat is only possible numerically. One can no longer speak of this unit having a substantial combat strength. The regiment must be newly trained from the ground up. This must begin with the training of new drivers, the familiarizing of the crews with one another and their tasks, the schooling of commanders and radio operators; furthermore, the binding together of the companies to combat units through closely monitored training exercises and familiarizing each battalion’s members with one another is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, new technical personnel must be trained; a large number of specialists (tank mechanics, tank radio repairmen, truck mechanics, etc.) are missing. One cannot master these tasks in snow and ice or filth and mud. For this purpose, one requires terrain and weather conditions that allow for it. Three full months is the minimum period of time required for this training. It should not be interrupted by periods of leave or else its success will be called into question. To this end, a barracks-like stay is again necessary so that through inner service, discipline can be solidified and renewed. The billeting must allow for the possibility of classroom instruction for platoons and companies. All of this is not possible in the local horse shanties.
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