Jeff Rutherford - The German Army on the Eastern Front - An Inner View of the Ostheer's Experiences of War

3) The increase of demands in the last 3 weeks combined with the losses of 30.11. (from 7 [officers]: 28 [NCOs]: 201 [men] attacking soldiers, 6:6:61 have become casualties, which means 60 per cent of officers, 20 per cent of NCOs and 30 per cent of the men) has caused the troops’ resistance power to drop to the minimum, especially since the designated and urgently needed authorized day of rest on 11.11. as well as on 26.11. could not be executed, but rather in its place a night movement under most difficult road conditions had to be carried out. Alertness at night could only be achieved by forcing the soldiers to stand next to their foxholes. Lack of trust in themselves and in their ability to use their weapons is widespread and this is caused by the fact that machine guns generally only fire, when a NCO or an offices himself mans the weapon.

Despite the circumstances described above, I believe the troops to be good in their substance and the condition is caused by overstrain, and is not a phenomenon of the fifth war year. A short period of relaxation is necessary, in which NCOs and officers could again influence their men; raising of morale and physical refreshment are inevitable. Then, in a short time, the will to resist will increase, the combat power will strengthen and the value of the troops which had proven itself many times in numerous hard fights in the past again will be achieved.

As this report notes, continual Soviet offensives had an extremely deleterious effect on the German army’s combat efficiency. As pointed or in previous documents, the losses of experienced commanders and men fell disproportionately on the combat units and, while their numbers could at least be partially made up for by putting rear-area soldiers into the front lines, their training, knowledge and abilities were simply lost. Constant combat meant that soldiers had no time to tend to their hygienic needs and this inevitably resulted in lice infestation and a series of debilitating diseases. The combination of sickness, a leadership vacuum and simple physical and mental exhaustion culminated in a situation in which a frontline German infantry regiment was assessed as incapable of mounting either a successful offensive or defensive operation. According to the regimental commander, only a period of sustained rest would allow for the unit to return to its previous state; for the German army in late 1943, however, the scarcity of reserves meant that rest was a luxury it could not afford.

The infantry crisis that permeated the German army in 1943 and 1944 was starkly described in the following letter sent by the first general staff officer (Ia) in the elite Grossdeutschland Division to a superior in December 1943. [49]

I used today’s thick fog to somewhat more closely inspect the present main combat line and to speak with the regimental commanders, the battalion leaders and the NCOs leading the companies. The following brief description comes out of this information.

1) The present main combat line (or MCL) is even significantly less favourable than it appears on the map; nearly the entire section of the Fusilier Regiment can be seen from a long distance on all sides and therefore it receives extraordinarily high casualties through enemy fire. The enemy himself has his numerous ATGs so superbly built into his line that in general, they have not been detected and combated by our Panzers. A shifting of the MCL into the prepared line on both sides of Wyssokij would therefore be especially desirable.

2) I myself looked at the just brought-in prisoners of the newly deployed independent 31st Guard Panzer Brigade, namely of the Motorized Rifle Battalion. They were again for the most part briefly trained Ukrainians, who, however, made a good impression. The sending in of this brigade shows that the enemy still has his main point of emphasis in this sector and therefore will again pursue his goal of a breakthrough in the next few days. This will give us no quiet in the next few days.

3) The following is to be said about our own troops:

Such a degree of exhaustion, which cannot be exceeded, has now occurred in all parts [of the regiments] up to the regimental staffs. As far as I know, we are indeed the sole division that has been constantly deployed at the point of emphasis and almost daily in combat without a day’s rest since the beginning of July (start of [Operation] Citadel). The result of this constant combat is that the greater part of the officers and almost all NCOs have become casualties and also a cadre of veteran men no longer exists. The few remaining officers found at the front are the only ones who can master the situation that now exists there, but they are no longer supported by NCOs because they are no longer available. Almost all of the men are apathetic to such an extent, that they are fully indifferent to being shot dead by their own officers or by the Russians. It is already sufficient for the Russians to stand up in their trenches and shout ‘Hurra’ to prompt everyone getting up out of our fox holes and retreating. This is the moment when even the most able officer no longer has any influence over the troops. The retreating men don’t even react to threats made with weapons any more. Any art of persuasion or appealing to their honour is likewise fruitless. One therefore needs to take into consideration that the men of these battalions are the best that there are in the German army because they constitute a carefully chosen group of replacements from the entirety of the Reich. The recruits, the majority of which unfortunately have already fallen, of course first and foremost look to the veterans and they retreat just as older men do, when they see the poor example. I have had details described to me on the spot that I will spare you, but which are really sad enough. That we are still successful in holding a position and ironing out smaller mishaps is either that sometimes an officer is successful in utterly forcing it through or the carefully maintained 16-man assault detachment of the regimental commander is thrown into the hot spot and will take those retreating forward again.

All in all, it’s a picture that cannot be thought of more unpleasantly and one expects of all the men considerably more than each man can normally physically and mentally fulfil.

The limit of effectiveness is far exceeded here. It is completely unclear to me how we should hold our present or other defensive positions under the expected further attacks. One must hope that the situation can once again be repaired through the use of tanks, assault guns and the artillery. I believe, however, that this game cannot be continued for much longer. It is now so that everything is now brought down to a common denominator: the battle can only be led through the artillery, tanks, and assault guns and these are there to prevent all deployed infantry from running away at the same time. When one succeeds in keeping a part of the men stay in the line through the action of these heavy weapons, then one can hope that the situation can once again be rectified at the difficult spot.

4) Measures against this complete physical and moral deterioration are difficult to find. Any and all spiritual vitamin shots are useless; but other measures, such as a summary court martial, death sentence, immediate weapon use by officers, etc., no longer is of any use. It means nothing to a man from a group when it is shared with him that Gefreite X has been shot because of cowardice when he doesn’t know this Gefreite X at all because everything is completely mixed up. Moreover, Gefreite X is missing the next day in the fox hole in which he might have been taken back to.

5) The real Grabenstärke [trench strength – a special form of combat strength] and therefore the men who are really deployed in the trenches, is so low that a man deployed [in the line] frequently cannot see his neighbour from his fox-hole. Through the constant casualties, this situation worsens hourly and daily. The battalions assembled out of many units are hardly manageable. The following were deployed from one of our strongest battalions, the I./Grenadier-Regiment, in the frontline this morning: 4 NCOs and 17 men from different branches of the service (from the supply leader’s alarm units, the artillery and so on). [50]2 NCOs and 18 men from the reconnaissance battalion, the engineer battalion of the division with a strength of 2 NCOs and 22 men. Altogether, it’s called the I./ Grenadier-Regiment G.D. [ Grossdeutschland ] and it has to hold a frontline of 2.3km with its 8 NCOs and 57 men. Any comment is superfluous.