Peter Kirsanow - Second Strike

Marshall looked about the room. “Anybody else?”

Secretary of State Ted Lawrence raised his hand tentatively. Regarded by many in the room as a self-promoting blowhard, even by Washington standards, he’d been chastened by his erroneous conclusions during the EMP affair. Many expected him to be replaced by Brandt after the midterm elections.

“Yes, Ted.”

“Mr. President, the troop presence near the Baltics is unremarkable. They’ve been more aggressive in that region ever since the previous administration bent over backward to make friends with them.” Lawrence struck a pedantic pose familiar to everyone who knew him. “Besides, the EMP affair was only a month ago. They have been exemplary members of the international community since then, even assisting the Western allies in the campaign against Iran. And while we’re skeptical that they were completely innocent in that affair, there really is little evidence that they did anything more than be indifferent to Iran’s efforts to strike us.”

Marshall nodded. “Thank you, Ted. But what do we make of Garin’s encounter with what he believes to be a Russian agent—or at least an associate of Bor?”

“Mr. President, not to downplay Mr. Garin’s information, but it’s no secret the Russians have scores of agents in the area,” Susan Cruz offered. “Yes, they’re up to no good, if by that we mean they are operating with Russian, not American, interests in mind. But that’s a pretty low bar. It’s true of nearly every substantial foreign power, including some of our allies.”

Several heads around the room nodded. Secretary of Defense Merritt’s was not among them.

“Mr. President,” Merritt said. “I respectfully submit that the prudent approach is to assume the worst, that the Russians are about to engage in hostile action and that such action affects the United States.”

Marshall asked, “Any ideas what the agent may have meant by ‘paralyze’?”

“Cyberattack,” Brandt said bluntly.

The room remained silent, partly because Brandt was so often right and partly because of the weight Brandt’s opinions carried with the president.

The Oracle’s sightless ice-blue eyes were cast in the general direction of the president. He listened for a response from anyone in the room. When none came he continued. “Mr. President, we should consider the possibility that the Russians are preparing to launch a massive cyberattack. And if our operating premise, as suggested by Doug, is to assume the worst, then we should expect it to affect every critical sector of our economy and government.”

“Upon what do you base this, Jim?”

“It’s a guess, but a guess informed by logic and the progression of Russian asymmetrical warfare. Consider that the EMP plot was essentially asymmetrical, so much so that we hadn’t developed a response doctrine in the event of an EMP.”

Marshall’s jaws tightened. He had been furious about learning during the EMP affair that the country had never developed a response doctrine to an EMP strike. “Please don’t tell me we haven’t developed a response doctrine to a massive cyberattack.”

“We have, Mr. President,” DHS secretary Cruz interjected. “My department, along with the Office of the DNI and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, has been hardening the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. We’ve prepared coordinated responses for various federal agencies, military, states, and local authorities.”

Marshall exhaled. “Thank goodness.”

“We’ve also had significant success in joint DOD and DHS Cyber Guard Exercises,” Cruz added. “The last such exercise took place earlier this summer.”

“So we’re up to speed against a cyberattack, then?” Marshall asked.

“I believe so, Mr. President,” Cruz replied.

“Ted,” Marshall said, turning to Secretary of State Lawrence, “what about coordination with our allies? If Russia strikes us there’s a good chance they’ll do so against other Western nations, particularly NATO signatories.”

“We’ve conferred with NATO allies on a regular basis, Mr. President. Many of them agree that we should do what we can to prevent cyberattacks, but the threat is somewhat overblown.” Lawrence quickly raised his hand. “That’s not to say it’s not a concern, but we and our allies are ahead of the game.”

Marshall turned to Brandt. “Why are you concerned about a cyberattack from the Russians, especially if—as it seems to be the case—we’re fairly well prepared?”

“Mr. President, both Susan and Ted are correct that we’ve been coordinating both within our government and with allies to prevent or respond to any major incident of cyberwarfare. But most of that coordination is at the administrative level and is mostly responsive, not preventative. The efforts are focused primarily on what should be done to minimize the effects of a cyberattack and what agencies are responsible for addressing and remedying such effects.”

“That’s not quite accurate, Mr. President,” Lawrence countered. “We have fairly robust defenses and countermeasures in place to deflect and thwart massive cyberattacks, not just at DHS and the Defense Department, but the CIA and NSA as well. Moreover, US Cyber Command has remarkable retaliatory capabilities that, among other things, act as a powerful deterrent.

“But more important, you may remember the NATO conference last spring on asymmetrical warfare where the consensus was that while we shouldn’t understate the threat of cyberwarfare, the threat has been vastly overstated.”

Marshall looked around the room. “Anyone else?”

“Mr. President,” Secretary of Defense Merritt said, “I also was in attendance at the NATO conference this spring. No doubt the presenters were the best minds on the topic. But you may recall the dissenting opinion of Hans Richter from the German Federal Office for Information Security. His hair was on fire. He related that the Germans only by chance had discovered cyberattacks against them that had corrupted several of their best-defended systems. According to Richter, it was clear the attacks were mere probing forays to gauge the vulnerability of German systems, but had they been full-blown attacks, catastrophic damage would have been done to critical infrastructure.”

“As I recall, Richter didn’t assign blame to any particular state actor,” Marshall said.

“He did not,” Merritt acknowledged. “But the Russians are the most capable. From a defense perspective, I submit the most responsible course of action is to assume a massive cyberattack would be catastrophic, and that the Russians may be behind it.”

Marshall turned to Brandt. “Jim?”

“I concur completely with Doug. Yes, the consensus is that a massive cyberattack might cause some problems but it wouldn’t be catastrophic. I respectfully submit this view, however well-considered, suffers from a profound lack of imagination.”

Marshall’s brow furrowed. “We just averted an EMP. Could it be as catastrophic as that would’ve been?”

“The word ‘paralyze’ was used,” Brandt replied. “That’s an apt description of what a major cyberattack could do to us. But only a partial description. It would also render us deaf, dumb, and blind.”

“Wonderful.” Marshall sighed. “I’m loving this job more every day. Elaborate, Jim.”

“Senate Armed Services conducted a hearing on this just a couple of months ago. The Russians could disrupt our electrical power grid, industrial control systems, communications systems—almost any system that isn’t air-gapped. We could be without lights, cell phones, computers. Financial data could crash and disappear—trillions upon trillions of dollars could evaporate. We would, indeed, be functionally paralyzed. We couldn’t identify and respond to external threats. The economy would be in turmoil. In many respects, we’d become the functional equivalent of a third world country. We would be dangerously overmatched against any of our present or potential adversaries.”