Аркадий Блинов: Аналитическая философия

D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 79 – 101.

См. обсуждение различных концепций не редуктивной зависимости в: Brian P. McLaughlin, ‘Varieties of supervenience’, Savellos and Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 87.

См.: Н. Гудмен, «Факт, фантазия и предсказание», Н. Гудмен, Способы создания миров, М. Праксис, 2001, 90 (и далее).

D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 90 – 91.

R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 87 – 88.

Там же, 94.

См. там же: 99 – 100.

Там же, 101.

См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.

G. Mandler, ‘Consciousness: Respectable, Useful, and Probably Necessary’, R. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium, Hillsdale: Erlbaum Press, 1975, 229.

Ср.: G. Güzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 17.

T. Shallice, ‘Dual Funсtions of Consciousness’, The Psychological Review, 79:5, 1972, 383 – 393.

См.: G. Güzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 18.

D. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63, 1, 1966, 166.

D. M. Armstrong, ‘The Causal Theory of the Mind’, Neue Heft für Philosophie, no. 11, 1977, 88.

См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 175 – 177.

Там же, 177 и далее.

D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1972, 249 – 258.

D. Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 216 – 222.

D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 208 – 209.

D. Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’, C. V. Brost (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, London, Macmillan, 1970, 67 – 79.

В: H. Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, 37 – 48.

Jaegwon Kim, ‘Physicalism and the Multiple Realisability of Mental States’, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory”, Monist 56, no. 2, 1972, 177 – 192.

N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325.

S. Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, 291 – 315.

Критик может счесть не вполне убедительным этот переход от качественных характеров к качественным состояниям: почему иметь определенный качественный характер, находясь в том или ином ментальном состоянии, должно означать нахождение в определенном качественном состоянии?

N. Block and J. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States Are Not?’, Philosophical Review 81, no. 2, 1972, 159 – 181.

N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325.

См.: J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, N. Y. Crowell, 1975, особенно: Ch. 2.

M. Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990, 236.

См.: M. Davis, ‘Externalism and Experience’, A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J. M. Larrazabal, Philosophy And Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, 1 – 33.

C. Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1992, 61 – 62.

G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, 104, n. 22.

См.: N. Block, ‘Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science’, Philosophical Review, 93, 1983, 499 – 542.

См.: M. Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990.