Peter Beale - Fallen Sentinel - Australian Tanks in World War II

2. AC2

Mr Alan Chamberlain of the Ministry of Munitions has located standard tank components in production in the US which he considers could be imported and assembled here. The assembly thus built would be capable of transmitting the power of only two Cadillac engines. If the armour is not to be reduced in thickness, the maximum speed of the tank will be 16 mph.

Munitions estimate that providing the US components can be obtained, production of the AC2 could start in February 1942, and 375 tanks would have been produced by March 1943.

3. M3 Light Tanks from the USA

British authorities in London control the allotment of all equipment available from the USA. Our High Commissioner in London, Mr Bruce, has advised that we may be able to obtain 400 of the American M3 light tanks, together with ammunition and spares. This tank is not suitable for fighting against modern German tanks, but should be quite satisfactory for home defence and training.

4. Tanks from the United Kingdom

Enquiries have been made with the War Office regarding the provision of British tanks to be manned by AIF Armoured Corps personnel. The War Office has now told our High Commissioner that they may be able to provide Mark III Infantry tanks (Valentines) for one armoured brigade AIF. These would be for delivery in the Middle East. We should therefore make sure that we have tank crews ready for the delivery of these tanks. At the same time we should continue the production of our own tanks as a matter of the greatest urgency.

As a parallel and related activity to Supplement 4 to 150/1940, the BBA was debating its own Agendum 38/1941 Supplement 7, ‘Formation of an armoured division – production of tanks’. 26This contained a request from the Department of the Army for the additional funding to buy the components for 400 AC2 tanks. The Board checked with General Northcott and confirmed that the Army’s requirement for tanks was now 400 M3 lights, 400 AC2s, and 385 AC1s.

The Board concurred with the need for the funds to be made available for these purchases, but once again (referring to their Minutes 627 and 631) drew attention as a matter of extreme concern to the size of the demands being placed on industry. They recommended that, in order to manage competing demands on labour, materials and facilities, a Priorities Authority should be established as a coordinated entity to plan the Commonwealth’s entire manufacturing program.

The War Cabinet discussed Supplement 4 to War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 on 4 July 1941, and presumably took into account the BBA’s deliberations. Minute 1169 records that ‘the Prime Minister and the Ministers for the Army and for Munitions should confer on the question of design and production of tanks, including the allocation of responsibility for design.’ 27

The armoured division was discussed again on 9 July. The CGS announced that the first armoured brigade was scheduled to go overseas around March 1942, and that the War Office had undertaken to provide infantry tanks for its equipment in the first quarter of 1942. 28

The War Cabinet made a number of decisions concerning Supplement 4 to Agendum 150/1940 on 10 July, including several relating to the production of tanks. Cabinet agreed to continue the policy of making complete tanks in Australia with production to commence on a shortened Australian cruiser tank (to be called the AC2) until production could commence on the AC1. Efforts were to be made to increase the proposed rate of production of AC1 and AC2 to exceed twenty-five tanks per month. The order for 400 M3 light tanks was confirmed. Any British offer of tank equipment which was considered necessary and within the nation’s manning capacity would be accepted. These decisions were recorded in Minute 1191. 29

On 11 July Essington Lewis wrote to General Northcott to tell him that a separate organisation for AFVs was to be established within the Department of Munitions. 30This would be known as the Directorate of AFVs (DAFV), and the head of this Directorate was to take charge of the production of AFVs. Input to DAFV would include specifications from the General Staff, and the DAFV would have a single drawing office dealing with both basic and detailed design.

The Design Section would comprise personnel from the present Military Design Section (AFV), and its head, Colonel Watson, who would report to the Director, AFV, Mr A.R. Code. 31

The next forward step in the production of tanks was described in the Director-General of Munitions’ Report 11, dated 23 July 1941. 32The report stated that an experimental tank depot to be built on nine and a half acres at Fisherman’s Bend, Port Melbourne, was 45% complete.

On the same day, the War Cabinet held a meeting in Melbourne. The Minister for the Army referred to cablegram 3715 of 12 July from the High Commissioner’s office, London, providing information on the supply of tanks. The July allotment of M3 lights for July had been increased to six. The War Office recommended that M3 mediums supplement M3 lights, and ultimately replace them. With regard to existing orders, Australian should stipulate that, having placed an order for 400 lights, following the delivery of the first 150 lights, the remainder could be replaced by mediums.

Cabinet agreed to an amendment to the order along these lines. The Minister for the Army told Cabinet of a proposal, put to him by the General Staff, that local production of AC2s be abandoned in view of the prospects of improved supplies of M3 cruisers from the US. Cabinet rejected this proposal and decided that the local production program for both AC1s and AC2s as authorised should be continued. These decisions were noted in Minute 1245. 33

This was not the end of the push to scrap the AC2 project. On 26 September General Northcott wrote to the Minister for the Army and recommended that the AC2 program should be abandoned, and production of the AC1 taken in hand without delay. 34He had been assured by the DAFV that an output of five AC1s per week could be reached from March 1942.

This recommendation attracted a rapid response. On 9 October 1941 the Secretary of the Department of Munitions advised his department that the Minister for the Army had approved a General Staff recommendation that the AC2 should not proceed, but that the AC1 be immediately accelerated as an Army equipment project of first priority. 35This amendment to the priority for production of Army equipment was confirmed by a Defence Committee statement on 3 November. 36

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, visited Australia and spoke to the War Cabinet on 16 October. One of the topics of his address was deficiencies in military equipment. 37

Sir Robert stated that Australia had been asked to assist in the provision of personnel for tank units and he hoped that forty-eight tanks would be delivered by January 1942. This was reasonably satisfactory, although double this number would have been welcome for strengthening the defences of aerodromes. Sir Robert added, however, that Malaya was not tank country, and could not claim a high priority for the supply of tanks in view of the urgent needs elsewhere.

It is not clear where the tanks were to come from or where they were going. What is clear is that Sir Robert was wrong in saying that Malaya was not tank country, as the Japanese would very decisively prove in only a few months’ time.