Jung Chang - Mao - The Unknown Story

Mao did not want to be seen to be purging Chih-tan, as he meant to exploit his name to lend legitimacy and prestige to his own rule. But nor did he intend to retain him — because he was a local. Mao was going to be involved in extorting food, money, soldiers and laborers out of the population, as the CCP had done in other bases before; and, as in the case of virtually all other Red bases, he knew that these policies were sure to meet resistance from local leaders, who might well lead a popular uprising against the Party. Mao had a different method for dealing with Chih-tan from those he used against other potential threats.

AS SOON AS he settled down, Mao went ahead with his project of trying to open a passage to a Russian-controlled border where he could pick up supplies, and especially arms. His plan involved crossing the Yellow River into the much richer province of Shanxi to the east, to acquire new manpower and provisions, even possibly to build a base, before turning north towards Russian-controlled Outer Mongolia.

The expedition began in February 1936. It garnered some spoils and recruits, but was rapidly driven back west of the Yellow River by Chiang’s troops, without getting anywhere near the Mongolian border. During this brief operation Chih-tan met his death, at the age of thirty-three. According to history books, he died in combat, but the overwhelming evidence points to murder.

Chih-tan was shot on 14 April 1936, at a place called Sanjiao, a ferry town on the Yellow River. The official account claimed that an enemy machine-gun that had engaged an advancing Red Army unit put a round in his heart. Chih-tan was not with the assaulting unit, nor caught in cross-fire. He was about 200 meters away, up a small hill from which he was observing through a telescope. The machine-gun that reportedly killed him was firing in a totally different direction, and if the official story is to be believed, it suddenly swiveled round and loosed a single burst that miraculously hit Chih-tan in the heart — at 200 meters. This machine-gun seems to have had a sniper’s accuracy.

Only two people were with Chih-tan when he was hit. One was the Political Security man in his unit, whose name was Pei, a star of the Chinese KGB. On the Long March, he had been given the crucial job of watching over the porters carrying the assets of the regime’s bank. The other man present was a bodyguard. After Chih-tan was shot, Pei sent the bodyguard to “fetch a doctor,” according to his own account, leaving himself the only man around when Chih-tan “completely stopped breathing.” There seems little doubt that Chih-tan was killed by Pei.

The sequence of events surrounding Chih-tan’s death strongly suggests that it was choreographed by Mao. A week before, Mao cabled Chih-tan that the 28th Army unit, “from now on comes directly under this HQ.” There was no discernible reason for this order — except, of course, that this way whatever happened to Chih-tan from then on would not be reported through the normal chain of command, but directly to Mao. Two days after that, Mao appointed Chih-tan to the Military Council, from which he had previously been excluded. This amounted to Chih-tan’s elevation to a major military position. If he died now, he would have the status of a hero and his men would be kept happy. Finally, on the 13th, it was Mao himself who ordered Chih-tan to go to Sanjiao, where he was killed the very next day.

When Chih-tan was buried, his widow was kept away from the interment. “You are not well,” Chou En-lai told her, “and seeing him will make you sadder.” This was an order. Seven years were to pass before she was allowed to have him exhumed, by which time the corpse had decomposed. The coffin was opened, at her request, when Chih-tan was given a public burial in a special shrine. Mao wrote an inscription, calling Chih-tan’s death “a surprise.” This was at a time when Mao particularly needed to ensure that there would not be any trouble in the base, and he was using the dead Chih-tan to lend himself authority.

Chih-tan was the only top leader of a Red base ever to die at the front. In addition, his former left-and right-hand commanders both fell dead in quick succession within weeks of him being killed — Yang Qi in March, and Yang Sen at the beginning of May. Within a few months of Mao arriving, all three top Shaanxi commanders were killed — a fate that befell none of the commanders from any other Red Army unit.

With the deaths of Chih-tan and these two top colleagues, any serious potential danger of rebellion against Mao’s rule over the base was removed. Thereafter, although there were small-scale revolts among the locals, there was no uprising big enough to threaten Mao’s regime.

As with the Long March, the Reds pretended that the goal was to fight the Japanese, and called it the “Anti-Japanese Vanguard,” with slogans like “Going east to fight Japan.” But this was pure propaganda. Mao’s force did not even try to get near the Japanese.

WHEN MAO arrived in the northwest at the end of the Long March in October 1935, his aim, other than sheer survival, was to open up a passage to the border of a Russian-controlled territory so as to receive the arms and other supplies that would enable him to expand. Chiang Kai-shek wanted the Reds kept penned in their corral. The man he assigned to the task was the former warlord of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, “the Young Marshal,” who had his HQ in the city of Xian, the capital of Shaanxi province. Mao was in the same province, some 300 km to the north.

There were two Russian-controlled territories through which arms could be delivered: Xinjiang, over 1,000 km to the west-northwest, and Outer Mongolia, more than 500 km due north. The Young Marshal’s vast army of some 300,000 was stationed in the provinces giving access to both of these.

The Young Marshal’s American pilot, Royal Leonard, has left a description of a worldly man: “My first impression … was that here was the president of a Rotary Club: rotund, prosperous, with an easy, affable manner … We were friends in five minutes …” After inheriting Manchuria when his warlord father (“the Old Marshal”) was assassinated in June 1928, the Young Marshal placed his domain under Chiang’s central government, while remaining its chief until Japan invaded it in 1931. He then retreated into China proper with 200,000 troops, and was subsequently given various important posts by Chiang. He had an apparently intimate relationship with Chiang and his wife. Thirteen years the Generalissimo’s junior, he was fond of saying that Chiang was “like a daddy to me.”

But behind the Generalissimo’s back, the Young Marshal plotted to supplant him. Having governed a land larger than France and England together, it irked him to be Chiang’s subordinate. He aspired to rule all of China. To this end, he had earlier made approaches to the Russians and had tried to visit the Soviet Union when he was in Europe in 1933, but the Russians were very wary and turned him down. Only four years earlier, in 1929, Stalin had invaded Manchuria and fought a brief war against him after he had seized the Russian-controlled railway in Manchuria. Moreover, the Young Marshal had expressed admiration for fascism, and was friendly with Mussolini and his family. In August 1935 a statement put out from Moscow under the name of the CCP called him “scum” and a “traitor.”

But once he was appointed Mao’s warden later that year, Moscow performed a U-turn. The Young Marshal had become worth courting. He could make the CCP’s life easier and, more importantly, help them link up with Russian supplies. Within weeks of Mao arriving in the northwest, Russian diplomats were deep in talks with the Young Marshal.